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Fallacies or analyses?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Jennifer Church
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601. church@vassar.edu

Abstract

To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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