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Fodor's frame problem and relevance theory

  • Dan Sperber (a1) and Deirdre Wilson (a2)

Chiappe & Kukla argue that relevance theory fails to solve the frame problem as defined by Fodor. They are right. They are wrong, however, to take Fodor's frame problem too seriously. Fodor's concerns, on the other hand, even though they are wrongly framed, are worth addressing. We argue that relevance theory helps address them.

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D. Sperber (1994) The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations. In: L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (eds), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture. Cambridge University Press. [DS]

D. Sperber & D. Wilson (1987) Précis of Relevance: Communication and cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10:697754. [DS, DLC]

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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