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Guilty consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

George Graham
Affiliation:
Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL 35294. arhu006@uabdpo

Abstract

Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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