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Human reasoning includes a mental logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

David P. O'Brien
David P. O'Brien
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Baruch College, City University of New York, New York, NY 10010. david_obrien@baruch.cuny.edu
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Abstract

Oaksford & Chater (O&C) have rejected logic in favor of probability theory for reasons that are irrelevant to mental-logic theory, because mental-logic theory differs from standard logic in significant ways. Similar to O&C, mental-logic theory rejects the use of the material conditional and deals with the completeness problem by limiting the scope of its procedures to local sets of propositions.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 96 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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