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Identifying the optimal response is not a necessary step toward explaining function

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Henry Brighton  and
Henrik Olsson
Henry Brighton
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany. hbrighton@mpib-berlin.mpg.deolsson@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
Henrik Olsson
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany. hbrighton@mpib-berlin.mpg.deolsson@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
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Abstract

Oaksford & Chater (O&C) argue that a rational analysis is required to explain why a functional process model is successful, and that, when a rational analysis is intractable, the prospects for understanding cognition from a functional perspective are gloomy. We discuss how functional explanations can be arrived at without seeking the optimal response function demanded by a rational analysis, and argue that explaining function does not require optimality.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 85 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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