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In the lab and the field: Punishment is rare in equilibrium

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Simon Gächter
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.ukhttp://www.nottingham.ac.uk/Economics/people/simon.gaechter

Abstract

I argue that field (experimental) studies on (costly) peer punishment in social dilemmas face the problem that in equilibrium punishment will be rare and therefore may be hard to observe in the field. I also argue that the behavioral logic uncovered by lab experiments is not fundamentally different from the behavioral logic of cooperation in the field.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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