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  • Cited by 2
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Levy, Neil 2012. Neuroethics. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, Vol. 3, Issue. 2, p. 143.

    Levy, Neil and McKenna, Michael 2009. Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 4, Issue. 1, p. 96.


Inferences are just folk psychology

  • Thomas Metzinger (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 October 2004

To speak of “inferences,” “interpretations,” and so forth is just folk psychology. It creates new homunculi, and it is also implausible from a purely phenomenological perspective. Phenomenal volition must be described in the conceptual framework of an empirically plausible theory of mental representation. It is a non sequitur to conclude from dissociability that the functional properties determining phenomenal volition never make a causal contribution.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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