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  • Cited by 2
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Levy, Neil 2012. Neuroethics. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, Vol. 3, Issue. 2, p. 143.


    Levy, Neil and McKenna, Michael 2009. Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 4, Issue. 1, p. 96.


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Inferences are just folk psychology

  • Thomas Metzinger (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0434015X
  • Published online: 01 October 2004
Abstract

To speak of “inferences,” “interpretations,” and so forth is just folk psychology. It creates new homunculi, and it is also implausible from a purely phenomenological perspective. Phenomenal volition must be described in the conceptual framework of an empirically plausible theory of mental representation. It is a non sequitur to conclude from dissociability that the functional properties determining phenomenal volition never make a causal contribution.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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