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A leaner nativist solution to the origin of concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Jean M. Mandler
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive Science, University of California, San Diego, CA 92093. jmandler@ucsd.eduhttp://www.cogsci.ucsd.edu/~jean/

Abstract

There must be innate conceptual machinery, but perhaps not as much as Carey proposes. A single mechanism of Perceptual Meaning Analysis that simplifies spatiotemporal information into a small number of conceptual primitives may suffice. This approach avoids the complexities and ambiguities of interactions between separate dedicated analyzers and central concepts that Carey posits, giving learning a somewhat larger role in early concept formation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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