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Misbelief and the neglect of environmental context

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

David Dunning
David Dunning
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. dad6@cornell.eduhttp://cornellpsych.org/sasi/index.php
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Abstract

Focusing on the individual's internal cognitive architecture, McKay & Dennett (M&D) provide an incomplete analysis because they neglect the crucial role played by the external environment in producing misbeliefs and determining whether those misbeliefs are adaptive. In some environments, positive illusions are not adaptive. Further, misbeliefs often arise because the environment commonly fails to provide crucial information needed to form accurate judgments.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 517 - 518
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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