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Nested sets and base-rate neglect: Two types of reasoning?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Wim De Neys
Wim De Neys
Affiliation:
Experimental Psychology Lab, University of Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. wim.deneys@psy.kuleuven.behttp://ppw.kuleuven.be/reason/wim/
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Abstract

Barbey & Sloman (B&S) claim that frequency formats and other task manipulations induce people to substitute associative thinking for rule-based thinking about nested sets. My critique focuses on the substitution assumption. B&S demonstrate that nested sets are important to solve base-rate problems but they do not show that thinking about these nested sets relies on a different type of reasoning.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 260 - 261
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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