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    Mandel, David R. 2015. Instruction in information structuring improves Bayesian judgment in intelligence analysts. Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 6, Issue. ,
    Ohlert, Christine R. and Weißenberger, Barbara E. 2015. Beating the base-rate fallacy: an experimental approach on the effectiveness of different information presentation formats. Journal of Management Control, Vol. 26, Issue. 1, p. 51.
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Nested sets theory, full stop: Explaining performance on Bayesian inference tasks without dual-systems assumptions1

  • David R. Mandel (a1)
Abstract

Consistent with Barbey & Sloman (B&S), it is proposed that performance on Bayesian inference tasks is well explained by nested sets theory (NST). However, contrary to those authors' view, it is proposed that NST does better by dispelling with dual-systems assumptions. This article examines why, and sketches out a series of NST's core principles, which were not previously defined.

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COPYRIGHT: © Cambridge University Press 2007
References
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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