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Overflow, access, and attention

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Ned Block
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY 10003. ned.block@nyu.edu

Abstract

In this response to 32 commentators, I start by clarifying the overflow argument. I explain why the distinction between generic and specific phenomenology is important and why we are justified in acknowledging specific phenomenology in the overflow experiments. Other issues discussed are the relations among report, cognitive access, and attention; panpsychic disaster; the mesh between psychology and neuroscience; and whether consciousness exists.

Information

Type
Author’s Response
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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