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Paradoxical self-deception: Maybe not so paradoxical after all

  • Stephanie L. Brown (a1) and Douglas T. Kenrick (a1)

Abstract

The simultaneous possession of conflicting beliefs is both possible and logical within current models of human cognition. Specifically, evidence of lateral inhibition and state-dependent memory suggests a means by which conflicting beliefs can coexist without requiring “mental exotica.” We suggest that paradoxical self-deception enables the self-deceiver to store important information for use at a later time.

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