Hostname: page-component-7dd5485656-s6l46 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-10-31T05:27:15.064Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive accessibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Michael Tye
Michael Tye
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712. mtye@mail.utexas.eduhttp//www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/tye
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Block tries to show that the results of the Sperling experiment lend support to the view that phenomenology outstrips cognitive accessibility. I argue that Block fails to make a compelling case for this general claim on the basis of the Sperling data.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 527 - 528
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Sperling, G. (1960) The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 74(11, Whole No. 498):1–29. [Whole issue.]CrossRefGoogle Scholar