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  • Cited by 3
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Ward, Dave Roberts, Tom and Clark, Andy 2011. Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience. Synthese, Vol. 181, Issue. 3, p. 375.

    Matey, Jennifer 2006. Two HOTs to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 19, Issue. 2, p. 151.

    Rosenthal, David M. 2000. Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition, Vol. 9, Issue. 2, p. 231.


Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like

  • David M. Rosenthal (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 March 1997

Even if A-consciousness and P-consciousness were conceptually distinct, it is no fallacy for researchers relying on a suitable theory to infer one from the other. But P-consciousness conceptually implies A-consciousness – unless one or the other is mere ersatz consciousness. And we can best explain mental states' being conscious, in any intuitively natural sense, by appeal to higher-order thoughts.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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