Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like

  • David M. Rosenthal (a1)
Abstract

Even if A-consciousness and P-consciousness were conceptually distinct, it is no fallacy for researchers relying on a suitable theory to infer one from the other. But P-consciousness conceptually implies A-consciousness – unless one or the other is mere ersatz consciousness. And we can best explain mental states' being conscious, in any intuitively natural sense, by appeal to higher-order thoughts.

Copyright
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×
Type Description Title
PDF

 PDF (187 KB)
187 KB

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 10 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 95 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 28th May 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.