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Phenomenological overflow and cognitive access

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

David M. Rosenthal
Affiliation:
Program in Philosophy and Concentration in Cognitive Science, City University of New York Graduate Center, New York, NY 10016-4309. davidrosenthal@nyu.eduhttp://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/dr.htm

Abstract

I argue that the partial-report results Block cites do not establish that phenomenology overflows cognitive accessibility, as Block maintains. So, without additional argument, the mesh he sees between psychology and neuroscience is unsupported. I argue further that there is reason to hold, contra Block, that phenomenology does always involve some cognitive access to the relevant experience.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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