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The relationship between conscious phenomena and physical reality in behaviour control: The need for simplicity through phenomenological clarity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 April 2008
Abstract
How can “predictive simulation” – as a conscious phenomenon, related to goal imagery – be interchangeable with mirroring, which is an automatic response that, from a first-person perspective, enters awareness only after the act? The correspondence between perception of another's action and execution of one's similar action may be an example of a general perception-motor interface that maps perception onto behaviour or disposition towards action, without the need for simulation.
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