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Reuniting (scene) phenomenology with (scene) access

  • David Papineau (a1)

Block shows that we can consciously see a scene without being able to identify all the individual items in it. But in itself this fails to drive a wedge between phenomenology and access. Once we distinguish scene phenomenology from item phenomenology, the link between phenomenology and access is restored.

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D. Papineau (2002) Thinking about consciousness. Oxford University Press.

G. Sperling (1960) The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 74(11, Whole No. 498):129. [Whole issue.]

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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