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The theoretical indispensability of concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Daniel A. Weiskopf
Daniel A. Weiskopf
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302. dweiskopf@gsu.eduhttp://www2.gsu.edu/~phldaw/
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Abstract

Machery denies the traditional view that concepts are constituents of thoughts, and he more provocatively argues that concepts should be eliminated from our best psychological taxonomy. I argue that the constituency view has much to recommend it (and is presupposed by much of his own theory), and that the evidence gives us grounds for pluralism, rather than eliminativism, about concepts.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 228 - 229
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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