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Triangulating phenomenal consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Patricia Kitcher
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093. pwkitche@ucsd.edu

Abstract

This commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal consciousness” may refer to our ability to monitor the rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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