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Understanding action with the motor system

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2014

Vittorio Gallese  and
Corrado Sinigaglia
Vittorio Gallese
Affiliation:
Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, 43125 Parma, Italy. vittorio.gallese@unipr.it http://www.unipr.it/arpa/mirror/english/staff/gallese.htm
Corrado Sinigaglia
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Milan, 20121 Milan, Italy. corrado.sinigaglia@unimi.it http://dipartimento.filosofia.unimi.it/index.php/corrado-sinigaglia
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Abstract

We challenge Cook et al.'s claim about the vagueness of the notion of action understanding in relation with mirror neurons. We show the multidimensional nature of action understanding and provide a definition of motor-based action understanding, shedding new light on the various components of action understanding and on their relationship. Finally, we propose an alternative perspective on the origin of mirror neurons, stressing the necessity to abandon the dichotomy between genetic and associative hypotheses.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 199 - 200
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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