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Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 May 2017

DAN M. KAHAN ,
ELLEN PETERS ,
ERICA CANTRELL DAWSON  and
PAUL SLOVIC
DAN M. KAHAN*
Affiliation:
Yale University, USA
ELLEN PETERS
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University, USA
ERICA CANTRELL DAWSON
Affiliation:
Cornell University, USA
PAUL SLOVIC
Affiliation:
Decision Research & University of Oregon, USA
*
*Correspondence to: Yale Law School, PO Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520, USA. Email: dan.kahan@yale.edu
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Abstract

Why does public conflict over societal risks persist in the face of compelling and widely accessible scientific evidence? We conducted an experiment to probe two alternative answers: the ‘science comprehension thesis’ (SCT), which identifies defects in the public's knowledge and reasoning capacities as the source of such controversies; and the ‘identity-protective cognition thesis’ (ICT), which treats cultural conflict as disabling the faculties that members of the public use to make sense of decision-relevant science. In our experiment, we presented subjects with a difficult problem that turned on their ability to draw valid causal inferences from empirical data. As expected, subjects highest in numeracy – a measure of the ability and disposition to make use of quantitative information – did substantially better than less numerate ones when the data were presented as results from a study of a new skin rash treatment. Also as expected, subjects’ responses became politically polarized – and even less accurate – when the same data were presented as results from the study of a gun control ban. But contrary to the prediction of SCT, such polarization did not abate among subjects highest in numeracy; instead, it increased. This outcome supported ICT, which predicted that more numerate subjects would use their quantitative-reasoning capacity selectively to conform their interpretation of the data to the result most consistent with their political outlooks. We discuss the theoretical and practical significance of these findings.

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Articles
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Behavioural Public Policy , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , May 2017 , pp. 54 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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