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Paternalism, coercion and the unimportance of (some) liberties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 October 2017

SARAH CONLY
SARAH CONLY*
Affiliation:
Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME, USA
*
*Correspondence to: Sarah Conly, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME, USA. Email: sconly@bowdoin.edu
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Abstract

Some object to paternalism when it forecloses options – when it makes it impossible, or at least very difficult, to pursue a particular course of action. This is because some argue that liberty is intrinsically valuable, and that to have liberty is to have options; thus, to lose options is to lose something intrinsically valuable. On that account, even if the loss of an option can be justified by gains of other intrinsically valuable things, it should be regarded as a loss. I argue that, in fact, some options have no value, so that their loss is not in itself even pro tanto bad. And, when losing options makes it more likely that we will achieve greater welfare, the loss of options is an unqualifiedly good thing. Thus, coercion, which removes some options, is not necessarily a bad thing in itself, and its loss can often be easy to justify.

Type
Articles
Information
Behavioural Public Policy , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , November 2017 , pp. 207 - 218
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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