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On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and The Next Stable Set

  • P.D. Welch (a1) (a2)

We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified (in terms of definitional complexity) account of varied revision sequences—as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.

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E-mail: Current address: Institut für Formale Logik, Währinger Str. 25, A-1090 Wien, Austria
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Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
  • ISSN: 1079-8986
  • EISSN: 1943-5894
  • URL: /core/journals/bulletin-of-symbolic-logic
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