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Strong Logics of First and Second Order

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2014

Peter Koellner
Peter Koellner*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, 25 Quincy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USAE-mail:, koellner@fas.harvard.edu
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Abstract

In this paper we investigate strong logics of first and second order that have certain absoluteness properties. We begin with an investigation of first order logic and the strong logics ω-logic and β-logic, isolating two facets of absoluteness, namely, generic invariance and faithfulness. It turns out that absoluteness is relative in the sense that stronger background assumptions secure greater degrees of absoluteness. Our aim is to investigate the hierarchies of strong logics of first and second order that are generically invariant and faithful against the backdrop of the strongest large cardinal hypotheses. We show that there is a close correspondence between the two hierarchies and we characterize the strongest logic in each hierarchy. On the first-order side, this leads to a new presentation of Woodin's Ω-logic. On the second-order side, we compare the strongest logic with full second-order logic and argue that the comparison lends support to Quine's claim that second-order logic is really set theory in sheep's clothing.

Type
Research Article
Information
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , March 2010 , pp. 1 - 36
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2010

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