Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) with his work on the constructible universe L established the relative consistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and the Continuum Hypothesis (CH). More broadly, he ensured the ascendancy of first-order logic as the framework and a matter of method for set theory and secured the cumulative hierarchy view of the universe of sets. Gödel thereby transformed set theory and launched it with structured subject matter and specific methods of proof. In later years Gödel worked on a variety of set theoretic constructions and speculated about how problems might be settled with new axioms. We here chronicle this development from the point of view of the evolution of set theory as a field of mathematics. Much has been written, of course, about Gödel's work in set theory, from textbook expositions to the introductory notes to his collected papers. The present account presents an integrated view of the historical and mathematical development as supported by his recently published lectures and correspondence. Beyond the surface of things we delve deeper into the mathematics. What emerges are the roots and anticipations in work of Russell and Hilbert, and most prominently the sustained motif of truth as formalizable in the “next higher system”. We especially work at bringing out how transforming Gödel's work was for set theory. It is difficult now to see what conceptual and technical distance Gödel had to cover and how dramatic his re-orientation of set theory was.

The Löwenheim–Skolem theorem was published in Skolem's long paper of 1920, with the first section dedicated to the theorem. The second section of the paper contains a proof-theoretical analysis of derivations in lattice theory. The main result, otherwise believed to have been established in the late 1980s, was a polynomial-time decision algorithm for these derivations. Skolem did not develop any notation for the representation of derivations, which makes the proofs of his results hard to follow. Such a formal notation is given here by which these proofs become transparent. A third section of Skolem's paper gives an analysis for derivations in plane projective geometry. To clear a gap in Skolem's result, a new conservativity property is shown for projective geometry, to the effect that a proper use of the axiom that gives the uniqueness of connecting lines and intersection points requires a conclusion with proper cases (logically, a disjunction in a positive part) to be proved.

The forgotten parts of Skolem's first paper on the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem are the perhaps earliest combinatorial analyses of formal mathematical proofs, and at least the earliest analyses with profound results.

There are Π5 formulas in the language of the Turing degrees, D, with ≤, ⋁ and ⋀, that define the relations x″ ≤ y″, x″ = y″ and so x ∈ L2(y) = {x ≥ y ∣ x″ = y″} in any jump ideal containing 0(ω). There are also Σ6 & Π6 and Π8 formulas that define the relations w = x″ and w = x′, respectively, in any such ideal I. In the language with just ≤ the quantifier complexity of each of these definitions increases by one. On the other hand, no Π2 or Σ2 formula in the language with just ≤ defines L2 or x ∈ L2(y). Our arguments and constructions are purely degree theoretic without any appeals to absoluteness considerations, set theoretic methods or coding of models of arithmetic. As a corollary, we see that every automorphism of I is fixed on every degree above 0″ and every relation on I that is invariant under double jump or joining with 0″ is definable over I if and only if it is definable in second order arithmetic with set quantification ranging over sets whose degrees are in I. Similar direct coding arguments show that every hyperjump ideal I is rigid and biinterpretable with second order arithmetic with set quantification ranging over sets with hyperdegrees in I. Analogous results hold for various coarser degree structures.