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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2009
The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan has, in recent years, attracted an ever-growing volume of research. In part, this may be attributed to the easier access to archival sources, both in England and—to a lesser extent—in the Nile Valley. In addition, there has evolved an increasing interest in bilateral relations between Egypt and the Sudan, prompted in part by the political outlook of Presidents Sadat and Numayri, and even more important, by the apparent decline in the Nile waters, especially in the 1980s. The Integration Charter {takamut), first announced by Presidents. Sadat and Numayri in 1974 and signed by Egypt and the Sudan in 1981, sought to establish co-operation, in a wide variety of spheres, which would—so it was hoped—ultimately lead to unity. These anticipations failed to materialize following the chatige of regime in the Sudan in 1985, and seem even less realistic under the present Sudanese fundamentalist dictatorship.
2 Bell, G., Shadows on the sand, (London: C. Hurst, 1983)Google Scholar, Thomas, G., Sudan 1950–1985: death of a dream (London: Darf Publications, 1990)Google Scholar, Collins, R. D., Shadows in the grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983)Google Scholar, Woodward, P., Sudan, 1898–1989: the unstable state (London and Boulder: L. Crook δ L. Rienner, 1990)Google Scholar, Najīb, Muḥammad, Kalimati li'l-ta'rīkh (Cairo: Dār al-kitāb al-namūdhajī, 1975)Google Scholar, Sabry, Hussein Zulfikar, Sovereignty for the Sudan (London: Ithaca Press, 1982Google Scholar), ‘Ramadān, Abd al-‘Aẓīm, Ukdhūbat al-isti ‘mār al-Miṣrī li'l-Sūdān (ru'ya ta'rikhiyya) (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Miṣriyya al-‘āma li'1-kitāb, 1988)Google Scholar, Usā;ma, al-Ghazātī Harb (ed.) Al-‘alaqāt al-Miṣriyya al-Sūdāniyya bayn al-māḍwa’l-ḥāḍir wa'l-mustaqbal (Cairo: Markaz al-buhūth wa'1-dirāsa al-siyāsiyya, 1990)Google Scholar, Beshir, Mohamed Omer, Revolution and nationalism in the Sudan (London: Rex Collings, 1974)Google Scholar, , Bashīr Muḥammad Sa'īd, Al-za'īm al-Azharī wa-'aṣruhu (Cairo: al-Qāhira al-ḥadītha li'1-ṭibā‘a, 1990)Google Scholar, Ibrāhīm, Hasan Ahmad, Muḥammad ‘Ali fi al-Sīdān, (dirāsa li-ahdāf al-fatḥ al-Turkī al-Miṣri) (Khartoum: Dār al-ta’līf wa'1-tarjama wa'1-nashr, n.d.)Google Scholar, SalīmMuḥammad Ibrāhīm, Abū Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, Abū, Alāthār al-kāmila li'l-Imām al-Mahdī (Khartoum: Dar jāmi'at al-Kharṭūm li'1-nashr, 1990)Google Scholar, Al-ḥaraka al-fikriyya fi al-Mahdiyya, al-ṭab'a al-thālitha (Khartoum: Dār jāmi‘at al-Khartūm li’lnashr, 1989)Google Scholar.
3 Daly, p. 28. It may be of interest to compare this with Deng, F. M., Recollections of Babo Nimr (London, 1982), 17–49Google Scholar. Nimr, nazir of the Missiriyya tribe in southern Kordofan, regarded Indirect Rule as preferable to central bureaucracy, which was introduced after independence. However, his view may be regarded as the exception rather than the rule.
4 Daly, 255; (the italics are mine).
5 Daly, p. 211, n. 22; quoting Bevin to Sargent, 30 August 1946, FO 371/53255 (italics mine). This was, as far as I know, the first and only time that a British minister of foreign affairs stated such views.
6 On this see my book Historical discord in the Nik Valley (London: C. Hurst, 1992), 69–81Google Scholar. See also some of the books mentioned above in n. 2.
7 Quoted from my interview with T. R. H. Owen, C.B.E., on 2 October, 1970.
8 Daly, 380, 381. Daly's reference to Owen is cited from his undated letter to Robertson, SAD/696/8.
9 Daly, pp. 384–5, 387–8; Salah Salim (not Salam as spelt by Daly) mentioned these accusations when he submitted his letter of resignation to the RCC in August 1955. For details see Ḥamad, Khiḍr, Mudhakkirāt, al-ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya al-Sūdūniyya, al-istiqlal wa-mā ba'dahu, (al-Shariqa: Maktabat al-sharq wa'1-gharb, 1980) 225–6Google Scholar; Salim in fact asked the British governorgeneral to send troops to the south to restore order, after the Torit uprising, but was told by the latter that the Sudanese army was quite capable of doing so without outside help; see also Trevelyan, H., The Middle East in revolution (London: Macmillan, 1970), 19–22Google Scholar; Britain's new ambassador in Egypt related and explained Nasser's change of heart.
10 On this see also my forthcoming review article in Middle Eastern Studies, ‘Sudan: diversity and conflict in an unstable state’, in which the following are reviewed: Abel, Alier, Southern Sudan: too many agreements dishonoured (Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990)Google Scholar, Khalid, Mansour, The government they deserve: the role of the elite in Sudan's political evolution (London and NewYork: Kegan Paul International, 1990)Google Scholar, and Woodward's, PeterSudan 1898–1989 (listed in n. 1)Google Scholar.
