The current literature in business ethics is tending toward an unacknowledged moral pluralism, with all the problems this position entails. An adequate moral pluralism cannot be achieved by a synthesis of existing theoretical alternatives for moral action. Rather, what is needed is a radical reconstruction of the understanding of the moral situation that undercuts some of the traditional dichotomies, provides a solid philosophical grounding which is inherently pluralistic, and offers a new understanding of what it is to think morally. The philosophical position of American pragmatism, as briefly sketched in this paper, offers one such possible reconstruction.

The logic of the commons is applied to the U.S. labor pool. It is argued that the labor pool is an “active” commons, a commons in which the resource as well as the users of the resource can change voluntarily. For this commons to be tended properly, technical solutions are ineffective and inappropriate; both employer and employee must have trust in the mechanisms that tie them together. Collaborative control is given as a possible framework for making the morality shift necessary to avoid ultimate tragedy.

This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and recommends mechanisms of accountability organizations, agents, and/or clients can recognize and employ to ensure agents’ fiduciary obligations to their clients.

Ethicists and legal theorists have proposed models of corporate culpability that shift the standard of guilt determination from vicarious attribution of individual action and intention to an assessment of culture, policies, as well as organizational action and inaction. This paper briefly reviews four prominent models of corporate culpability, arguing that each makes claims that extend well beyond the limits of existing law. As an alternative to these models, a constructive corporate fault is described that relies on both objective and subjective reasonableness judgments. The paper concludes with a consideration of constructive corporate fault in relation to an Accountability model of corporate liability.

The first issue of Business Ethics Quarterly appeared five years ago. This article classifies the content of the 141 articles that have appeared since that time along 18 dimensions, and 118 categories within those dimensions, to determine trends within the discipline. The major trend appears to be a shift in focus towards the increased discussion of a new approach/paradigm for the field, and towards a normative/descriptive interface of the theory. The major problem seems to be a lack of explicit conceptual definition and beginning empirical effort to support that new focus, which may thus prove unsustainable over time.

The subject of journal quality has received little attention in the business ethics literature. While there are reasons for this past neglect, there are important new considerations which make it vital that researchers now address this topic. First, virtually all business school departments use evaluations of journal quality as an important indicator of scholarly achievement, yet business ethics has no such studies. Second, as many schools are beginning to ask ethicists to publish in the wider management literature, it is important to find a way to compare journal quality across these domains. In the absence of such studies, performance review committees (including tenure decisions) may well make incorrect inferences about journal quality within business ethics or assume that ethics journals are not prestigious unless a candidate can provide evidence to the contrary (i.e. as in a study like this one). This study addresses these two issues. It relies on an opinion-based survey to establish journal quality by incorporating a list of journals within business ethics and the wider management literature. The target population is active business ethics researchers within the Society for Business Ethics (SBE). We present the results of the study and discuss their implications.

In his “Why be Moral? A Different Rationale for Managers,” (Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 4, April, 1994), La Rue Tone Hosmer argues that managers should be moral because “acting in ways that can be considered to be ‘right’ and ‘just’ and ‘fair’ is absolutely essential to the long-term competitive success of the firm.” According to Hosmer, moral behavior generates trust among stakeholders, which leads to stakeholder commitment, which leads to increased stakeholder effort, which ultimately leads to corporate success. Though we agree with Hosmer's causal reasoning, we are concerned about an ancient loophole, namely, cases where the mere appearance of morality will generate the same trust, and commitment, and so on, and will thus enable managers to reap the material benefits of morality while nevertheless engaging in immoral practices. We conclude that a virtue ethics perspective will strengthen Hosmer's model so as to cover such cases.