Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) seems to grow in popularity by the day, but central considerations like best practices, standardized metrics, and a demonstrable positive impact on people and the environment are almost nonexistent. Yet, in the United States’ regulatory framework, one thing about ESG does seem clear—its instrumental role in value sustainability for investors. Drawing on postcolonial, decolonial, and radical Black theoretical perspectives, this article argues that the ability of ESG to capitalize on socioecological considerations is no accident. This critical analysis characterizes ESG as a paradigmatic example of the extractive nature of racial capitalist political economies like the United States. The article contends that ESG, much like the overarching liberal capitalist economy, is antithetical to the collective liberation project that is central to the radical Black tradition. In service of the imaginative worldmaking praxis that motivates this critical approach, the article offers a preliminary radical Black political economic framework.

Algorithmic management is deeply changing the way work is performed and the interaction between managers and workers in organizations. It also heavily affects the conditions for meaningful work highlighted by existing literature. Therefore, organizations need an appropriate framework to enable meaningful work when adopting algorithmic management systems. This article presents a normative study of the conditions for work to be meaningful in this new scenario. To fulfil this purpose, it adopts a MacIntyrean approach, according to which work is meaningful when it embodies practice-like characteristics. The article identifies the main threats of algorithmic management and characterizes the normative conditions organizations should meet to enable meaningful work. In addition, the article explores the strategies of resistance that workers use to live up to the standards of meaningful work when organizations are not capable or willing to provide those conditions.

How does a role—whether in business, law, government, or some other institution—change what is morally permissible or obligatory? Here I present three options and argue for the third. On the balancing model, a role simply gives its occupant additional normative reasons, to be weighed against all other normative reasons. On the shielding model, a role comes with its own moral code, blocking the force of all role-external reasons. On the filtering model, a role selectively filters its occupant’s reasons for action, creating obligations or permissions to act on a narrowed range of considerations. I argue that the filtering model offers a superior analysis of the ethics of roles, including the concepts of professional integrity and discretion. I focus on three difficult cases: a nuclear safety regulator, a criminal defense lawyer, and a corporate lobbyist. I conclude by discussing the implications of the filtering model for business ethics.

Political theory increasingly intersects with business ethics. A notable example is the application of philosopher Jürgen Habermas by Scherer and Palazzo, along with their interpreters, to advocate for the “politicization of the corporation” and “Political Corporate Social Responsibility” (PCSR). Consequently, business ethics focused on corporations also becomes politicized. From a Habermasian perspective, this politicization offers legitimacy through deliberation and consensus. However, a less represented perspective in business ethics discourse—legal philosopher Carl Schmitt’s—highlights the darker sides of politicization, viewing it as an intensification of enmity. This shift undermines the unique ethical-reflective nature of business ethics.

While from an instrumental perspective stakeholder relations can promote sustained competitive advantage, normative arguments underscore the importance of morally informed principles, especially when relational strategies have uncertain future outcomes and are prone to imitation. This study investigates how such instrumental and normative views can be complementary based on the case study of Natura, a cosmetics company procuring natural inputs from the Amazon rainforest via supplier relations that are open to multiple parties, including competitors. The research shows that Natura developed and reinforced a morally informed normative core specifying how the company and its managers should act. This resulted in a long-term commitment to the open relational strategy, especially when future outcomes were largely uncertain, which in turn promoted emergent instrumental gains via deepened relational attachments and substantive stakeholder engagement. Importantly, the company’s controlling shareholders strongly influenced the normative core, thus underscoring the importance of identifying key shareholders and their values.

We review and synthesize over two decades of research on ethical culture in organizations, examining eighty-nine relevant scholarly works. Our article discusses the conceptualization of ethical culture in a cross-disciplinary space and its critical role in ethical decision-making. With a view to advancing future research, we analyze the antecedents, outcomes, and mediator and moderator roles of ethical culture. To do so, we identify measures and theories used in past studies and make recommendations. We propose, inter alia, the use of validated measures, application of a wider range of theories, adoption of longitudinal studies, and study of group-level data in organizations. We explore research possibilities in new and emergent forms of organizations, ways of organizing work, and technology in ethical decision-making, such as the role of artificial intelligence. We also recommend the study of a broad range of leadership styles and their influence in shaping ethical cultures in organizations.

Responsible innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) calls for public deliberation: well-informed “deep democratic” debate that involves actors from the public, private, and civil society sectors in joint efforts to critically address the goals and means of AI. Adopting such an approach constitutes a challenge, however, due to the opacity of AI and strong knowledge boundaries between experts and citizens. This undermines trust in AI and undercuts key conditions for deliberation. We approach this challenge as a problem of situating the knowledge of actors from the AI industry within a deliberative system. We develop a new framework of responsibilities for AI innovation as well as a deliberative governance approach for enacting these responsibilities. In elucidating this approach, we show how actors from the AI industry can most effectively engage with experts and nonexperts in different social venues to facilitate well-informed judgments on opaque AI systems and thus effectuate their democratic governance.

Why do organizations conduct job interviews? The traditional view of interviewing holds that interviews are conducted, despite their steep costs, to predict a candidate’s future performance and fit. This view faces a twofold threat: the behavioral and algorithmic threats. Specifically, an overwhelming body of behavioral research suggests that we are bad at predicting performance and fit; furthermore, algorithms are already better than us at making these predictions in various domains. If the traditional view captures the whole story, then interviews seem to be a costly, archaic human resources procedure sustained by managerial overconfidence. However, building on T. M. Scanlon’s work, we offer the value of choice theory of interviewing and argue that interviews can be vindicated once we recognize that they generate commonly overlooked kinds of noninstrumental value. On our view, interviews should thus not be entirely replaced by algorithms, however sophisticated algorithms ultimately become at predicting performance and fit.

This article examines the place of Machiavelli’s Prince in the history of ethics and the history of leadership philosophy. Close scrutiny indicates that Machiavelli advances an ethical system for leadership that involves uprooting corruption and establishing rule of law. He draws on history and current affairs in order to obtain a realistic understanding of human behavior that forms a basis for a consequentialist ethics. While he claims a good leader might do bad things, this is in situations where necessity constrains a prince to choosing the “least bad” course of action. Furthermore, Machiavelli advocates winning the goodwill of followers through leadership as a source of power. Machiavelli’s leadership ethics has a sophistication not fully enjoyed by his reputation in management scholarship. He would not score as especially “Machiavellian” on the Mach IV. Many of his ideas contain seeds for theories that are now considered important for leadership today.

Social media companies commonly design their platforms in a way that renders them addictive. Some governments have declared internet addiction a major public health concern, and the World Health Organization has characterized excessive internet use as a growing problem. Our article shows why scholars, policy makers, and the managers of social media companies should treat social media addiction as a serious moral problem. While the benefits of social media are not negligible, we argue that social media addiction raises unique ethical concerns not raised by other, more familiar addictive products, such as alcohol and cigarettes. In particular, we argue that addicting users to social media is impermissible because it unjustifiably harms users in a way that is both demeaning and objectionably exploitative. Importantly, the attention-economy business model of social media companies strongly incentivizes them to perpetrate this wrongdoing.

Contemporary human-centered organization and management practices endanger the planet’s health, affecting the life and death of multiple species—including humans. Drawing on insights from multispecies ethnography and feminist new materialism, this article contributes to the business ethics literature by developing a theoretical framework for multispecies organizing as a matter of care. Going beyond existing understandings of human-animal relations, we show how ethico-political dynamics shape multispecies relations in three ways: how we and other species relate to ecologies-in-place (affective relationalities); what we and other species do (vital doings); and, finally, what kinds of worlds we—through our ethical sensibilities—commit to bringing into being (ethical obligations). Using an illustrative example of a rewilding site in England, this article shows how multispecies organizing plays out in a specific ecology-in-place. Our argument has important implications for the conception and contemporary practices of the organizational ethics of life and death.