What a difference a decade makes. Ten years ago the term “stakeholder” was slang for any neglected group affected by a corporation. To be sure, the word had been molded with precision by a thin, important line of management theorists. And to be sure also the word was sometimes used by managers who wanted to justify their personal commitments to groups other than stockholders, such as employees and customers. But like slang, “stakeholder” seemed perfectly plastic and therefore conceptually flawed. It meant one thing to one person, something else to another.

Today the term has arrived. Management journals and consultants flaunt it, and articles devoted to one or another interpretation of stakeholder theory are commonplace. Both the Encyclopedia of Management (Freeman 1998) and the Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics (Freeman 1997) identify stakeholder theory as one of a tiny handful of recognized models for interpreting corporate responsibility. As the term rose to prominence, it acquired more solidity, and while varying interpretations of it can be found, a core of meaning pervades current stakeholder literature.

The success of the stakeholder terminology and of its accompanying theory has not been accidental. One of the influential forces galvanizing attention was the six-year effort on the definition of the corporation, sponsored by the Sloan Foundation, that situated the stakeholder concept at the center of its project. Through this project, books, conferences, meetings with stakeholder groups, and finally the “Principles of Stakeholder Management,” commonly referred to as the “Clarkson Principles,” brought energy and interest to stakeholder research.

This study explores a phenomenon that has been shown to adversely affect managers’ decisions—competitive irrationality. Managers are irrationally competitive in their decisions when they focus on damaging the profits of competitors, rather than improving their own profit performance. Studies by Armstrong and Collopy (1996) and Griffith and Rust (1997) suggest that the phenomenon is common but not universal. We examine the question of why some individuals exhibit competitive irrationality when making decisions, while others do not by focusing on four aspects of moral philosophy—deontological orientation, cognitive moral development, idealism, and relativism. Results suggest that individuals high in deontological orientation, high in cognitive moral development, high in idealism, and low in relativism will be less competitively irrational than those who are not.

A significant effect of China’s rejection of a planned economy for a free market is the stimulus this has given to discussion of the relationship between morality and the market. Some Chinese believe that the introduction of a market economy has had a negative effect on public morality. Others disagree and maintain that it has had only a positive effect. Besides this particular debate there are two others. In the first of these debates, it is maintained on the one side that conduct in the market is amoral and essentially contractual or transactional in nature: a boundary must be drawn between economic conduct and conduct in other spheres of social life. Against this it is argued that ethical norms apply equally to all aspects of social life including the economy. In the second debate one side holds that the market engenders its own “ethical” norms. In opposition it is argued that the moral categories articulated in moral philosophy are applicable to behaviour in the market.

Health care has been a hot topic within the United States for over a decade. Despite the many changes that have taken place, health care—and more specifically, versions of what have been termed “managed care”—continues to be a subject of intense debate and ongoing change. Whether the discussion is about access to care, quality of services, costs of care, or strains in the health care provider-patient relationship, a wide variety of stakeholders (e.g., patients, health care providers, health care organizations) have expressed frustration with the health care system. One of the central rallying cries behind the debate about health care is concern about the influence of “business” on health care. This special issue emerges out of the recognition that health care remains in flux, that health care continues to be a controversial subject among a wide array of stakeholders, and that the influence of business on health care is a key underlying source of tension.

Part of this debate has to do with what constitutes a just health care system. On the one hand, people in our society want to have access to high-quality care. More specifically, they want to be able to utilize the latest technology, care that is available when they need it (especially in crisis), a highly skilled care provider they can trust and develop a relationship with, and to not have to wait to gain access. On the other hand, people want a health care system they can afford. They want a health care system that is efficient, that offers reasonably priced services, and that doesn’t unduly strain the financial resources of families or the state.

This article begins by showing how recent controversies over the widespread promotion of artificially gene-altered foods are rooted in opposing ethical and ideological worldviews. It then explains how these contrasting worldviews have led to a practical, ethical, and ideological standoff and, finally, suggests the combined use of casuistry and virtue ethics as a way for both sides to move ahead on this pressing issue.

This paper utilizes a qualitative case study of the health care industry and a recent legal case to demonstrate that stakeholder theory’s focus on ethics, without recognition of the effects of incentives, severely limits the theory’s ability to provide managerial direction and explain managerial behavior. While ethics provide a basis for stakeholder prioritization, incentives influence whether managerial action is consistent with that prioritization. Our health care examples highlight this and other limitations of stakeholder theory and demonstrate the explanatory and directive power added by the inclusion of the interactive effects of ethics and incentives in stakeholder ordering.

After exploring MacIntyre’s (1985) practice—institution distinction, the article demonstrates its applicability to business-as-practice and to corporations as institutions. It then considers the implications of MacIntyre’s schema to ethical schizophrenia, to the claim that the market is a source of the virtues and to the opposite claim that capitalism corrodes character. A fully worked out modern virtue ethics, based on MacIntyre’s work, is then established and the claim is made and substantiated that such an understanding of MacIntrye’s work revitalises it and makes it directly applicable to business and to corporations.

Stakeholder theorists have typically offered both a business case and an ethics case for business ethics. I evaluate arguments for both approaches and find them wanting. I then shift the focus from ethics to law and ask: “Why should corporations obey the law?” Contrary to what shareholder theories typically imply, neoclassical or profit maximization theories of the firm can offer answers based only on instrumental justifications. Instrumental justifications for obeying the law, however, are pragmatically and normatively incoherent. This is because the modern corporation is a legal artifact. It exists because communities create the legal framework necessary for its existence. Individual corporations can therefore be said to owe their existence to a partnership (what might be called a social contract) between shareholders and governments, a partnership that is itself built on the shared though often implicit understanding that corporations have an unconditional (categorical) obligation both to obey the law and to treat their stakeholders ethically while generating wealth for their shareholders.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that at least one strain of what has come to be called “stakeholder theory” has roots that are deeply libertarian. We begin by explicating both “stakeholder theory” and “libertarian arguments.” We show how there are libertarian arguments for both instrumental and normative stakeholder theory, and we construct a version of capitalism, called “stakeholder capitalism,” that builds on these libertarian ideas. We argue throughout that strong notions of “freedom” and “voluntary action” are the best possible underpinnings for stakeholder theory, and in doing so, seek to return “stakeholder theory” to its managerial and libertarian roots found in Freeman (1984).

In this paper we highlight the emergence of organizational ethics issues in health care as an important outcome of the changing structure of health care delivery. We emphasize three core themes related to business ethics and health care ethics: integrity, responsibility, and choice. These themes are brought together in a discussion of the process of Mission Discernment as it has been developed and implemented within an integrated health care system. Through this discussion we highlight how processes of institutional reflection, such as Mission Discernment, can help health care organizations, as well as corporations, make critical choices in turbulent environments that further the core mission and values and fulfill institutional responsibilities to a broad range of stakeholders.

This article argues that the important organizational values to study are organizational moral values. It identifies five moral values (honest communication, respect for property, respect for life, respect for religion, and justice), which allow parallel constructs at individual and organizational levels of analysis. It also identifies dimensions used in differentiating organizations’ moral values. These are the act, actor, person affected, intention, and expected result. Finally, the article addresses measurement issues associated with organizational moral values, proposing that content analysis is the appropriate measurement technique to be used for an organization-level conception of moral values.

This paper discusses global corporate citizenship in the twenty-first century. The primary focus is on the responsibility of management educators to foster among students an understanding of the causes and consequences of business activitiy that creates organizational wealth, including the role of stakeholders. The modern corporation is a stakeholder enterprise: stakeholders enable the business to create wealth and require that it distribute wealth appropriately. The stakeholder enterprise model, which has been so economically successful, also implies corporate citizenship responsibilities. The Clarkson Principles are discussed as a means through which educators and managers can better understand and address the challenges of corporate citizenship in the modern world.

This article puts forth the thesis that the contractualist account of moral justification affords a powerful reply in business contexts to the question why a business person should put ethics above immediate business interests. A brief survey of traditional theories of business ethics and their approaches to moral motivation is presented. These approaches are criticized. A contractualist conception of ethics in the business world is developed, based on the work of John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon. The desire to justify our choices in terms that others can be reasonably expected to accept, or at least in terms that others cannot reasonably reject, is identified and differentiated from other accounts of motivation. It is this desire that constitutes the core motive to be moral in business on the contractualist conception. Implications of this contractualist conception for the theory and practice of business ethics are then discussed.

In contrast to “social contract” theories of the corporation, a moral justification of the corporation as actual, not hypothetical, agreement is presented. Central to the justification is the idea of personal projects, as developed by Loren Lomasky. The key idea is the role that corporations can play in the construction and advancement of personal, value-creating projects. The concept of the corporation as actual agreement, as a type of “right of association” theory, is defended against influential criticism of such theories by Thomas Donaldson.

This article examines the ethical issues raised by the pricing of priceless goods. Priceless goods are defined as ones that are widely held to have some special non-market value that makes them unsuited for buying and selling. One subset of priceless goods is prescription drugs—particularly life-saving and life-enhancing ones. Drug makers are under pressure to price their medicines responsibly, which means to restrain their prices (and profits). However, this article argues that it is precisely because life-saving and life-enhancing medicines are priceless that it is especially urgent to leave companies free to charge market prices for them.

In this article we first review the development of the concept of global business citizenship and show how the libertarian political philosophy of free-market capitalism must give way to a communitarian view in order for the voluntaristic, local notion of “corporate citizenship” to take root. We then distinguish the concept of global business citizenship from “corporate citizenship” by showing how the former concept requires a transition from communitarian thinking to a position of universal human rights. In addition, we link global business citizenship to global business strategy and to three analytical levels of ethical norms. Finally, we trace a process whereby global businesses can implement fundamental norms and learn to accommodate to legitimate cultural differences.

In providing an ethical guide for managers, the Clarkson Principles offer one part of a possible professional code, namely, that managers have a fiduciary duty—a duty of loyalty of the corporation’s stakeholders. However, the Clarkson Principles contain little advise for managers when they act politically to fashion the regulatory framework in which stakeholders negotiate. When managers participate in these arenas, I argue that they ought to assume a second fiduciary duty—a duty of loyalty to fair bargaining. Where the first duty of loyalty pertains to the firm’s “constituents,” the second refers to the firm’s “constitution”—to the rules by which the firm’s stakeholders bargain and to the background conditions that distribute advantages. Together, these two fiduciary duties establish the large good—development as freedom—from which a managerial profession can mature.

Contrary to criticisms by Thomas McInerney, Durable Goods proposes a realistic and empirically testable “covenantal” ethic for moving management and labor beyond tactics of mutual coercion and evasion. Nonetheless, two questions asked by McInerney remain germane. First, should the moral claims of management and labor always receive equal moral consideration, as a matter of justice? To this substantive question Durable Goods admittedly provides a less than satisfactory answer. Second, can the normative theory proposed by Durable Goods, based in part as it is on the Bible, meet the standards of cogency, coherence, and parsimony appropriate to business ethics as a field of rigorous inquiry? This methodological question remains unaddressed.

This essay examines the impact of the imposition of businesses techniques, in particular, those associated with Total Quality Management, on the relationships of important components of the health care delivery system, including payers, managed care organizations, institutional and individual providers, enrollees, and patients. It examines structural anomalies within the delivery system and concludes that the use of Total Quality Management techniques within the health care system cannot prevent the shift of attention of other components away from the enrollee and the patient, and may even contribute to it. It speculates that the organization ethics process may serve as a quality control mechanism to prevent this shift and so help eliminate some of the ethically problematic processes and outcomes within the health care delivery system.

Tom Carson’s recent paper on “Deception and Withholding Information in Sales” contains a critique of my contribution to sales ethics. In this response I outline the approach I develop in two earlier papers and address the four criticisms Carson makes. These criticisms are largely based on a misunderstanding of my position. I suggest that our fundamentally different approaches to applied ethics may lie at the root of Carson’s misunderstanding. Carson uses what I call a theory-application model in which the search for justification in terms of fundamental rules is central, while I attempt to contextualize ethical judgments and consider alternative ways of structuring social roles. In contrasting these approaches I raise the question of which way of doing applied ethics is likely to be more fruitful.