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9363 results in The Cambridge Law Journal

Page 132 of 469

  • A Coda to Coase

  • Matthew H. Kramer
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 56 / Issue 2 / July 1997
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 275-283
    Print publication:
    July 1997

  • As anyone even noddingly familiar with law-and-economics can attest, the name of Ronald Coase has become associated with the vision of a world that is free of transaction costs. Such an association derives largely from Coase's classic article, “The Problem of Social Cost”. However, as should be recognised by anyone who peruses that article, its author's chief concern lies in taking account sustainedly of the presence and implications of transaction costs.

  • CLJ volume 56 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 56 / Issue 2 / July 1997
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. f1-f2
    Print publication:
    July 1997
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  • Statuta Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and the Common Law: A Continental Prespective

  • Reinhard Zimmermann
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 56 / Issue 2 / July 1997
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 315-328
    Print publication:
    July 1997

  • “All statutes contrary to the common law … are to be interpreted strictly and have to be accepted in the most exact manner as they stand, and speak”. “Statutes which repeal the [common] law, have to be interpreted most strictly, and cannot be extended to cases which are not expressed in them.” “Statutes … generally consist more in ‘thus I want and thus I command’ than in a regulation according to reason”; “they fade like the moon's shadows, and like the moon they wax and wane at the legislators' whim”. It may be thought that these four sentences refer to the approach traditionally adopted in England to the interpretation of statutes. But they do not. They encapsulate the attitude adopted by the learned lawyers of the older ius commune, particularly in 13th and 14th century Italy, and in 16th century Germany. An English colleague has suggested that “civilian lawyers regard our case law with admiration and our statute book with despair”.

  • The Personality of the Foreign State in English Law

  • Geoffrey Marston
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 56 / Issue 2 / July 1997
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 374-417
    Print publication:
    July 1997

  • The Daily Cause Lists at the Royal Courts of Justice disclose that from time to time foreign sovereign States appear as parties to civil litigation in the courts of England and Wales, mostly as plaintiffs but also, in cases often better known because of the issues of immunity to which they give rise, as defendants. In his judgment in the House of Lords in Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No. 3), Lord Templeman, eferring to the case concerning the financial collapse of the International Tin Council decided the previous year by the same tribunal,1 observed:2 “The Tin Council case reaffirmed that the English courts can only identify and allow actions by individuals, sovereign states and corporate bodies.”

  • Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of the Fraud Exception

  • Jennifer Payne
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 56 / Issue 2 / July 1997
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 284-290
    Print publication:
    July 1997

  • If students of company law know just one case, that case will be Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. which firmly established the English law principle that a company is a legal person entirely separate and distinct from the members ofthat company. It is trite law that a rather hefty veil is drawn between these two that can be lifted only in a limited number of circumstances that seem to fluctuate according to current judicial thinking. However, it “is well established that the courts will not allow the corporate form to be used for the purposes of fraud or as a device to evade a contractual or other legal obligation”, a principle which is referred to hereafter as the “fraud exception” to the Salomon principle.

Page 132 of 469