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9363 results in The Cambridge Law Journal

Page 149 of 469

  • Property Notions in the Law of Obligations

  • Geoffrey Samuel
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 53 / Issue 3 / November 1994
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 524-545
    Print publication:
    November 1994

  • When the coach carrying Mr. and Mrs. Houghland from Ternhill to Cheshire arrived at its destination, Mrs. Houghland's suitcase could not be found. The suitcase had been loaded on to one of Low's coaches at Southampton, but this coach had broken down at Ternhill and the luggage had been transferred by the passengers to the luggage compartment of a relief vehicle which had arrived some three hours later. The coach company was unable to trace the case or to explain how it had disappeared and in a subsequent claim, either for its value or for damages for its loss, the County Court found in Mrs. Houghland's favour. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.

  • New Rights for Old?

  • Andrew Halpin
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 53 / Issue 3 / November 1994
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 573-595
    Print publication:
    November 1994

  • The objective of this article is very limited, but if realised, I believe it has far-reaching implications. I want to examine the narrow topic of Unger's approach to rights. In exploring this objective I shall not be concerned with considering Unger's general approach to law, or with other aspects of his legal theory. Nor shall I question the assumptions that Unger may be making about the human condition or the nature of the world in which we live. Ignoring these wider concerns, my objective is to demonstrate that the new rights of Unger's deviationist doctrine in fact embody the old rights of legal formalism that their author has purported to abandon. The implications are twofold. First, for Unger's general enterprise: if it turns out that there is nothing new in his radical showpiece of rights, then some aspersions must be cast on the claims of novelty and radical efficacy made for “the program of empowered democracy” in which this showpiece is set.

  • Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person

  • John Gardner
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 53 / Issue 3 / November 1994
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 502-523
    Print publication:
    November 1994

  • The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is much disparaged by today's criminal lawyers. Its provisions have been described as “impenetrable” by the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords could not conceal its dissatisfaction with what is called “the irrational result of this piecemeal legislation”. Andrew Ashworth has written of the “antiquated and illogical structure” of an Act which the Law Commission regards as “unsatisfactory in very many respects”. Most recently Brooke J., launching the latest version of the Commission's reform package, lambasted the operation of the 1861 Act as “a disgrace”, and claimed that this hostile view is shared in every corner of the criminal justice system.

Page 149 of 469