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9363 results in The Cambridge Law Journal

Page 223 of 469

  • The European Court as an International Tribunal*

  • Richard Plender
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 42 / Issue 2 / November 1983
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 279-298
    Print publication:
    November 1983

  • To Speak of the European Court as an international tribunal is to expose oneself to the charge of heresy. No principle of Community law is more fundamental, none more frequently reiterated by the European Court, than that the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community “is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting States” but rather constitutes a new legal order capable of conferring rights and imposing obligations directly upon individuals. In the Court's words, “By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the E.E.C. Treaty has created its own legal system, which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States.” For this reason, Professor Lipstein has, with justification, said of Community law that it represents a “peculiar phenomenon … which does not fit into any regular pattern of international law.”Professor Hay has insisted upon describing it as “supranational law” and Professors Brown and Jacobs maintain that the function of the European Court, in interpreting and applying that law, is "constitutional" rather than international.

  • CLJ volume 42 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 42 / Issue 2 / November 1983
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. f1-f3
    Print publication:
    November 1983
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  • Immunity From Prosecution

  • A. T. H. Smith
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 42 / Issue 2 / November 1983
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 299-327
    Print publication:
    November 1983

  • When Sir Anthony Blunt's misdeeds were exposed to public gaze by revelations that he was the so-called fourth man in the notorious group who had spied for Russia, an important area of the criminal justice process was partially uncovered as a result. The Prime Minister confirmed in a House of Commons Written Answer that Mr. Blunt (as he later became) had been granted immunity from prosecution as long ago as 1964 by the Attorney-General, Sir John Hobson. No attempt was made to suggest that this was a routine occurrence, but in the ensuing debate, the Prime Minister asserted that “it is not unusual for the Attorney-General to be asked to authorise immunity from prosecution in return for co-operation in pursuit of inquiries. It happens from time to time in the course of criminal investigations.”

  • From Representation to Expectation: Estoppel as a Cause of Action

  • M. P. Thompson
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 42 / Issue 2 / November 1983
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 January 2009, pp. 257-278
    Print publication:
    November 1983

  • In recent years, one of the most vibrant doctrines has been that of equitable estoppel. This doctrine is generally seen as having two main branches: the defensive doctrine of promissory estoppell and the older and more aggressive doctrine of proprietary estoppel, which can itself be used to obtain rights: to be the cause of action itself. The aim of this article is to analyse the central concepts of equitable estoppel in order to distinguish it from its common law counterpart, to consider its relationship to the law of contract and also to present the two main branches as being closely related concepts, based on common underlying themes.

Page 223 of 469