The applicability to administrative decision-making of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (which requires that the determination of a person's “civil rights” should be by an “independent and impartial tribunal”) is somewhat vexed. First, it is often uncertain when an administrative decision determines “civil rights”. And, secondly, since non-compliance at first instance may be cured where the person aggrieved has access to a court of “full jurisdiction”, it is important but often uncertain to know what “full jurisdiction” is in the circumstances. The full tale is told in (2001) 60 C.L.J. 449 (Forsyth) and in Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law, 8th edn. (2000) at pp. 441-444. Those unfamiliar with these technical issues should read a standard account before turning to Runa Begum v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council (First Secretary of State Intervening) [2003] UKHL 5, [2003] 2 W.L.R. 388 (H.L.).

Until recently, it was widely accepted that a recipient of company distributions such as dividends paid in breach of the requirements of the Companies Act 1985 (“the Act”) could only be made to repay such distributions if he knew of the illegality. Whether one looked to the Act (to wit, section 277) or beyond (to the “knowing receipt”-type liability encountered in Precision Dippings Ltd. v. Precision Dippings Marketing Ltd.), liability required knowledge. In Bairstow v. Queen’s Moat House plc, however, there appears to be the faintest of suggestions that this position may be open for re-examination. This is reinforced by Lord Nicholls’ recent speech in Criterion Properties Plc v. Stratford UK Properties LLC.

FOLLOWING a referendum on 23 June 2016 in which 52% of voters (38% of the total electorate) had expressed a preference for the UK to leave the EU, the Government announced that it would start the process of withdrawal, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), by notifying the European Council of the UK's decision, exercising the Government's prerogative power to conduct foreign relations. A number of legal challenges were fast-tracked to the Supreme Court. In R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Birnie and others intervening) [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 after an expedited hearing, the Court decided two issues: (1) whether the Government could exercise its power under the royal prerogative to give notice, or needed an Act of Parliament to authorise the giving of notice; and (2) whether the Government required the consent of devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales before giving notice or introducing to Parliament a Bill authorising the giving of notice. The Court sat unprecedentedly with all 11 serving members. On issue (1), the Court, by an 8–3 majority, held that an Act of Parliament would be required in order to authorise the giving of notice. On issue (2), the Court unanimously held that there was no legal requirement for consent by the devolved institutions.

Thirty men decide to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling bicycles. They procure the formation, under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, of the X Bicycle Company, Limited. In the memorandum of association the objects of the company are stated to be: “The manufacture and sale of bicycles.” The associates supply that legal unit with funds through payment of subscriptions to its stock, and the company proceeds to manufacture and sell bicycles. But the company loses money, and, on the recommendation of the directors and with the approval of all the shareholders, the manufacture, of bicycles is stopped, and the funds of the company are employed in maintaining a motor omnibus service between two towns. The driver of one of these omnibuses, while acting within the scope of his employment as prescribed by the directors of the company, by his negligence runs into A, who was at the time in the exercise of due care, and breaks A's leg. The driver is financially irresponsible. A sues the X Bicycle Company, Limited, and that company defends on the ground that maintaining the omnibus service was ultra vires. Should this defence be successful?

It is axiomatic that divorcing spouses cannot by agreement oust the jurisdiction of the court to award ancillary relief: Hyman v. Hyman [1929] A.C. 601. Finality can only be achieved by obtaining the sanction of the court in the form of a consent order, invoking a procedure which requires full disclosure of all material factors so that the court can exercise its own discretion on the basis of the information put before it: Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.33A; Livesey v. Jenkins [1985] A.C. 424. But out-of-court agreements made by the parties are not without significance. Far from it, they will be treated as a very important consideration should the court subsequently be asked by one of the parties to make an award of ancillary relief, and will not usually be departed from unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that injustice will be done by holding the parties to their terms: Edgar v. Edgar [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1410. Presumptive enforceability has been criticised as “the worst of both worlds”, as the parties must go to court to determine whether the agreement they have reached is legally binding: Pounds v. Pounds [1994] 1 F.L.R. 775, 791, per Hoffmann L.J. Either the agreement should bind, or it should be wholly disregarded.

The value of hire-purchase transactions has remained at a fairly steady level during the past few years, and it would be pleasant to think that the law affecting them has reached a comparable stage of maturity and stability. This is unfortunately not the case. Instead, the number of legal problems continues to multiply and some aspects of the law of hire-purchase have reached a state of complexity which must baffle even the most expert lawyer. Of these none is more confusing than the law relating to the so-called “minimum payment clause.”

IN a groundbreaking decision, the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter v Canada (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 5 has declared the criminal law measures prohibiting the provision of assistance in dying unconstitutional. In doing so, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled its previous decision (Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney-General) [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519) upholding the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide.

According to P. Huvelin the lex Atinia read as follows: Quod subruptum erit, nisi in potestatem eius, cui sub-ruptum est, revertatur, eius rei aeterna auctoritas esto. This reconstruction is no doubt fairly accurate. What, then, is the relation of the lex Atinia to the XII Tables? For, as it appears from the sources, it was already the XII Tables that excluded a res furtiva from usucaption.