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The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 September 2006

Bassel F. Salloukh
Affiliation:
American University of Sharjah

Abstract

Abstract. Electoral engineering determines prospects for centripetal politics in postconflict societies. Lebanon's postwar elections have been contested by interethnic electoral alliances in multi-ethnic electoral districts. Interethnic coalitions, vote pooling and bargaining have structured the results of these elections, as have the electoral laws demarcating the boundaries of electoral districts. Democratization, peace building and ethnic harmony have been the main victims of these cross-ethnic alliances, however. This paper seeks to explain this Lebanese puzzle by examining the institutional determinants of cross-ethnic electoral alliances in the 1992, 1996 and 2000 parliamentary elections.

Résumé. Dans les sociétés post-conflictuelles, l'ingénierie électorale détermine l'éventualité de politiques centripètes. Les élections libanaises d'après-guerre se sont disputées entre des alliances électorales interethniques dans des districts électoraux multiethniques. Les coalitions interethniques, le “ vote pooling ” et le marchandage, de même que les lois électorales qui déterminaient la configuration des circonscriptions électorales, ont structuré les résultats de ces élections. Or, la démocratisation, la construction de la paix et l'harmonie ethnique ont été les victimes principales de ces alliances interethniques. La présente analyse vise à expliquer ce paradoxe libanais en étudiant les déterminants institutionnels des alliances électorales interethniques lors des élections parlementaires de 1992, 1996 et 2000.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2006 Cambridge University Press

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