This paper explores the perception and politics of air pollution in Shanghai. We present a qualitative case study based on a literature review of relevant policies and research on civil society and air pollution, in dialogue with air quality indexes and field research data. We engage with the concept of China's authoritarian environmentalism and the political context of ecological civilization. We find that discussions about air pollution are often placed in a frame that is both locally temporal (environment) and internationally developmentalist (economy). We raise questions from an example of three applications with different presentations of air quality index measures for the same time and place. This example and frame highlight the central role and connection between technology, data and evidence, and pollution visibility in the case of the perception of air pollution. Our findings then point to two gaps in authoritarian environmentalism research, revealing a need to better understand (1) the role of technology within this governance context, and (2) the tensions created from this non-participatory approach with ecological civilization, which calls for civil society participation.

Few policy domains can come close to Taiwan affairs in exemplifying the way Jiang's reigning authority has been self-extended beyond his official tenure. Fighting for his place in history, Jiang's desire to reset the cross-Strait scoreboard before his full retirement remains strong. Also, the structure of the newly elected SCP clearly reinforces Jiang's ability to cast a long shadow over Hu for some time to come. Hu is thus expected to adhere with great caution to Jiang's updated policy guidelines on Taiwan affairs, as laid out in the retiring general secretary's farewell Party work report to the CCP 16th Congress. Besides, Hu has few incentives not to because the Taiwan affairs portfolio carries excessive risk and a slow return, in addition to being one of the policy areas that he is least prepared for. However, the symbolic significance of the Taiwan issue also means that the generational turnover from Jiang to Hu cannot be considered complete until Hu takes full command over Beijing's policy towards Taiwan.

China's third national census, taken as of 00:00 hours 1 July 1982, presumably counted more than one billion people. This census is of enormous importance not only for Chinese statistics but for world demography, because it may resolve at last the perennial doubts about the size of China's population. It will also provide many kinds of demographic data not now available from any other source in China and add greatly to the national stock of statistics. The data will support a tremendous upsurge in demographic analysis and serve as a base for future sample surveys. They will have many immediate practical applications in planning and administration. Assuming that the central instructions have been generally observed, the census will do much to enhance China's statistical credibility throughout the world.

China experienced extensive civil strife in 1974, as elite factionalism during the “criticize Lin Biao and Confucius” campaign revived popular contention in the provinces. Past research has characterized these conflicts as a “second Cultural Revolution” – an offensive by resurgent red guards and rebels to resist the restoration of purged civilian officials to powerful posts. In Nanjing, however, the conflicts were of an entirely different nature. Civilian cadres directed the campaign against army officers who still dominated civilian government throughout the province. Popular protests in Nanjing were not led by former rebels, whose ranks had been decimated by unusually harsh military suppression campaigns, but were instead protests by ordinary citizens who had suffered in the purges and rustication campaigns of the late 1960s. While the campaign in cities like Hangzhou and Wuhan was an offensive by resurgent rebels against civilian officials, in Nanjing civilian officials used the campaign to ensure their victory over military rivals. The Hangzhou and Wuhan pattern revived the politics of the 1960s, while the Nanjing pattern anticipated the protests against Cultural Revolution abuses characteristic of the end of the Mao era.

The first Chinese Five-Year Plan ended in 1957, and the second began the following year. The launching of the “great leap forward” in industrial and agricultural production and the transformation of the rural collectives into “People's Communes” in 1958 accelerated the pace of work of both workers and peasants.

After the technological revolution in dry farming of the Sui Dynasty (581–618 a.d.) made possible the rapid spread of wheat farming, this crop gradually became important for farmer and consumer alike. By the 20th century wheat had come to occupy about one-fifth of the total foodgrain sown area and ranked second to rice as the most important foodgrain. More than one-third of the population consumed wheat. Roughly two-thirds of the total wheat production came from the north China plain and nearly another third from the central provinces. Winter wheat made up 87 per cent of the wheat sown area with the remaining being spring wheat.

The recent events in China are surely drama of the highest order, but at times it has seemed that the actors themselves were not entirely sure who was writing the lines. In fact what we seem to be witnessing is a form of commedia dell'arte: improvisation within a certain tacitly understood framework. The cultural revolution appears to have taken new turns and to have broken into new channels precisely because the actors have been faced with new and unforeseen circumstances as it has run its course. No faction in the struggle has been able to impose its will on the Party or the country by fiat; new devices and stratagems have been brought into play in what has looked like desperate attempts to gain the upper hand. It has clearly been a battle of the utmost seriousness, but there appear to have been limitations on the resultant chaos. Economic disorganisation does not seem to have occurred on the scale of the later stages of the Great Leap Forward. Nor, despite the clashes, confusion and bitter infighting, have new centres of power, totally divorced from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself, arisen. The cultural revolution has been pre-eminently a struggle within the Party.

Any attempt to gauge the magnitude and composition of Soviet and Chinese economic assistance to North Vietnam since 1955 comes up against the problem of statistical secrecy. The North Vietnamese are the worst offenders: they have published no foreign trade returns, and their general statistical reporting is in the worst Stalinist percentile tradition. In reply to a question put to him by a French correspondent, a Dao Nai coal mine official stated: “Here in the mine we are not interested in tons; we are interested only in percentages. Tons are a matter for the Ministry of Heavy Industry in Hanoi.” A Soviet specialist stationed in Hanoi confided to the same correspondent: “They no longer permit us to get near the machines which we furnished them with.… It is worse here than in China.” Unfortunately, Chinese statistics, though more plentiful, are not much better. Soviet figures are the best of a bad lot, but they give only a partial, not unbiased, picture. Analysis of the North Vietnamese economy therefore reduces itself to the kind of detective work by which Western economists from 1929 to 1954 tried to piece together such information on the Soviet economy as Stalin's security-minded statisticians released.

In a political environment that remains (at best) officially sceptical about the enterprise, representative surveys on Chinese politics have nevertheless grown substantially in number in the past two decades: political scientists trained and based outside mainland China conducted a mere two such surveys in the 1980s, but the number increased more than tenfold in the 1990s and continues to rise steadily.

This article investigates change processes regarding the managerial aspects of organizing cultural heritage activities in China. The focus is not on the historical and artistic meanings of archaeological discoveries in themselves; nor on the technical, scientific and methodological repercussions of conservation and restoration; nor on the evolution of museology per se. Rather, the core of the analysis is on new managerial problems along the “archaeological chain” (archaeological discoveries, restoration, museum definition and public access to cultural heritage) posed by new professional discourse and the overall evolution of the economic and political context. The article is based on field research carried out in Luoyang, Henan province. The micro view adopted (managing practices more than policies), and the unusual access to data (including financial figures on individual entities) represent a unique opportunity for a sort of “journey” inside the Chinese public sector.

At the outset of the recent anti-Confucian and Lin Piao campaign it was forecast that this movement would “ surely create still more •r favourable conditions for the emancipation of women.” x To create conditions advantageous to women the campaign set out to identify the obstacles inhibiting the redefinition of the role and status of women, j The identification of problem areas is not a new element in the history of the women's movement, indeed the problems have been stated time and again. The significance of this campaign lies in its concentrated and analytical attempt to integrate the redefinition of the female role with a nation-wide effort to change the self-image and expectations of both men and women. In this it provides a contrast with the strategy of the previous national campaign, the Cultural Revolution. Historically the women's movement has been very much concerned with raising the confidence of women in their own individual and collective abilities and translating the individual experience of suppression into a coherent analysis of oppression, but there is evidence to suggest that there was too little attention given to the position of women in the Cultural Revolution. For instance many associations and enterprises encouraged their members to believe that so long as overall revolutionary aims were fulfilled, there was no need to pay” particular attention to the position of women.2 The recent campaign and its application to practical problems among both men and women is a new recognition that because of their history of oppression it is still necessary to pay special attention to the restraints that continue to hinder the redefinition of women's role and status in society.

China's rise as a major power constitutes one of the most significant strategic events of the post-Cold War period. Many policy-makers, strategists and scholars express significant concern over the implications of China's growing military and economic capabilities for the future security environment in Asia and beyond. Such concern derives in part from an anticipation of the systemic security problems that have historically accompanied the emergence of a new power. In the Chinese case, however, these anxieties are greatly compounded by the rapidity of internal change under way in China, the general lack of knowledge about Chinese strategic ambitions, the existence of many unresolved Chinese territorial claims, the intense suspicion and even hostility toward the West harboured by China's leadership, and China's internal political and social instabilities.

Literature on scientific controversies has inadequately attended to the impact of globalization and, more specifically, the emergence of China as a leader in scientific research. To bridge this gap in the literature, this article develops a theoretical framework to analyse global scientific controversies surrounding research in China. The framework highlights the existence of four overlapping discursive arenas: China's national public sphere and national expert sphere, the transnational public sphere and the transnational expert sphere. It then examines the struggles over inclusion/exclusion and publicity within these spheres as well as the within- and across-sphere effects of such struggles. Empirically, the article analyses the human genome editing controversy surrounding research conducted by scientists in China between 2015 and 2019. It shows how elite scientists negotiated expert–public relationships within and across the national and transnational expert spheres, how unexpected disruption at the nexus of the four spheres disrupted expert–public relationships as envisioned by elite experts, and how the Chinese state intervened to redraw the boundary between openness and secrecy at both national and transnational levels.

When the Chinese Communists finally consummated their seizure of power in mainland China, one of the first tasks which faced them was that of elaborating a formal institutional structure for the exercise of regular public authority. Indeed, while the new leadership now undoubtedly enjoyed de facto control over the country and the mass of the people, it found itself quite destitute of those normal channels of state regulation and administrative management which serve to bestow legitimacy on a claimant to the role of national government and to distinguish a duly constituted, relatively stable political order from an altogether fluid interlude of revolutionary action predicated on ad hoc use of organised force under a central direction. The Party soon moved to make up for this grave deficiency by creating, on paper at least, a complex mechanism of state administration to back up its bid for recognition as the official spokesman for the Chinese nation and, concurrently, provide it with the wherewithal to play that role effectively.

The current controversy between Great Britain and China regarding the legal status of Hong Kong, having lain dormant for many years, was made explicit by a public exchange of statements between the governments of the two countries during and after the visit to Beijing of British Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher in September 1982.

The gross value of agricultural output in the People's Republic of China increased as much in the eight years from 1978 to 1986 as it did in the 21 years from 1957 to 1978. In per capita terms, the average annual rate of growth rose from 0·4 per cent to 4·8 per cent, the most rapid growth for any comparable period since 1949. How was this dramatic turnaround achieved?

The world's environmental technology and service industry, although comparatively young, is already important in global terms. In 1992 the value of the world market was estimated at US$210 billion, which was comparable to the global aerospace and pharmaceutical industries. By the year 2000 the market is expected to have grown to around US$335 billion and to have reached a value of US$640 billion by 2010.

During the National Salvation Movement of the mid-1930s, the Shanghai Party forged its most workable alliance not with members of the proletariat but with progressives from the city's middle and upper classes. Making use of multi-class patriotism, Party leaders established a co-operative relationship with members of the elite that became a crucial part of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resistance work against Japan. In many cases, the relationship continued into the post-war years and contributed significantly to the CCP's easy takeover of the city in May 1949.

Since its inception in 1986, Taiwan's main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has struggled to establish itself as a competitor for national political power. The victory of DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 presidential election marked a major breakthrough, not only for the DPP, but for Taiwan's young democracy as well. This article examines the party's history with an eye to explaining both its extended failure to win national office and its eventual success. The paper identifies two sets of factors: aspects of Taiwan's political system that worked to the advantage of the ruling KMT and historical errors committed by the DPP. It then shows how the KMT's advantages degraded in 2000, just as the DPP overcame its self-imposed liabilities, resulting in a DPP presidency.