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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
The Concordat of Vienna (1448) was one of the most suggestive historical phenomena of the fifteenth century. Drafted in the midst of a century characterized by diplomatic intrigue and institutional flux, and ratified amid the pageantry of traditional ceremony, it implicitly suggested the restoration of order and stability. The agreement appeared to signify the re-establishment of papal supremacy, the destruction of conciliarism, and even the partial restoration of the medieval Christian Commonwealth by virtue of the submission of the Empire to Rome. Contemporary notions relating to the Concordat of Vienna are invariably drawn from the works of the papal historians Ludwig Pastor and Mandell Creighton. Both viewed it as a papal victory and a defeat of the Council of Basel. F. X. Seppelt took a more cautious position and suggested that the eventual implementation of the agreement brought many concessions to the territorial princes. Joseph Gill in his recent biography of Pope Eugenius almost entirely bypassed this phase of the pontiff's activity. Only Bertram's monograph on the concordats of the later middle ages devoted some space to the 1448 pact. While presenting some interesting conclusions, he failed to adequately interpret any one concordat in the light of its own peculiar political background.
1. In a broad sense the term Coneordat might describe any agreement between a prelate and a secular government. Technically, the term has a narrower meaning “… in that only those contracts are understood by it, which the Pope, as head of the Church, concludes with the government of an individual state in an attempt to clarify its relationship with the Church.” Phillips, G., Kirchenrecht (Regensburg, 1840), III, p. 675.Google Scholar
2. See Pastor, L., Geschichte der Päpste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1886), I, pp. 298–299Google Scholar; Creighton, M., A History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome (London, 1919), III, pp. 106–109Google Scholar; Seppelt, F.X., Geschichte der Päpste (Munich, 1957), IV, pp. 310–311Google Scholar; Gill, J., Eugenius IV Pope of Christian Union (London, 1961)Google Scholar; Bertrams, W., Der neuzeitliche Staatsgedanke und die Konkordate des ausgehenden Mittelalters (Rome, 1942).Google Scholar
3. See Albert, F. P., Papst Eugen der Vierte Ein Lebensbild aus der Kirchengeschichte des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts (Mainz, 1884)Google Scholar. In his recent biography on Eugenius IV Joseph Gill observed that he was unable to locate this study. It was subsequently found by the author in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich. The book is by no means a definitive study, but does contribute to an understanding of the career of Eugenius until 1432.
4. Aschbach, J., Geschichte Kaiser Sigmunds (Hamburg, 1845), IV, pp. 57–106.Google Scholar
5. Gill, op. cit., pp. 209–211. Eugenius was convinced that all reform must come from the Papal See. To the Archbishop of Cologne he wrote (February 11, 1432); “We, who through our Pontificate wished to reform the Church at the Council of Constance, are deeply concerned that now, during our reign, this our wish be implemented and that this pious work be personally completed.” Mansi, J. D., Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio (Graz, 1961), XXIX, p. 558Google Scholar. A letter of similar sentiment was sent to Emperor Sigismund on June 26, 1432. Ibid., XXX, p. 162.
6. Pückert, W., Die Kurfürstliche Neutralität während des Basler Concils (Leipzig, 1858), p. 156Google Scholar; Herre, H. (ed.), Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Friedrich III, 1440–1441 (Göttingen, 1957), XV, Nos, 120, 121, cited hereafter as RTA.Google Scholar
7. The Council of Basel sent a legation headed by John of Ragusa. It was granted two interviews with the Emperor, RTA, Nos. 159, Article 1; 160, 162, Article 1. Frederick's attitude towards the Council was partially manifested in the letter of safe conduct given to the legation. Though it gave no favorable response to the deposition of Eugenius IV, the document noted that the possibilities for peace within the Church would be weakened if the Council of Basel were dissolved. The Council misinterpreted Frederick's statement and felt it was a recognition of Felix V and the work of the Council. Perouse, G., Le Cardinal Louis Aleman et la Fin du grand Schisme (Paris, 1904), p. 364Google Scholar; Monumenta Conciliorum Generalium saeculi decimi quinti (Vienna, 1886), III, pp. 493–494.Google Scholar
8. The interests of the Pontiff had met some unexpected setbacks. Several preelection meetings were held by the Rhenish Electors at Mainz (August 14, 1439) and Frankfort (November 11, 1439), Bachmann, A., “Die Deutsche Könige und die kurfürstliehe Neutralität: 1438–1447,” Archive für Osterreichische Geschichte, 75 (1890), No. VII and at LahnsteinGoogle Scholar. Goerz, A. (ed.), Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier (Treves, 1861), II, p. 173Google Scholar. Pope Eugenius sent a special delegation headed by Jaeobus de Oratoribus which finally met the Electors at Lahnstein. The group was allowed to present its ease and even submitted a memorandum, RTA, XV, No. 71Google Scholar. The petition was rejected pending the election of a new emperor. After listening to the report of his delegation, Eugenins seat a letter to the Electors admonishing them to establish peace in the realm, presumably by punishing Felix V. Ibid., No. 113. In view of the coming election and his own interests, Eugenius exhibited a passive attitude, instructing the papal representatives to make their representations after the election. The directives were never earrried out as the documents were confiscated when the papal emissaries journeyed through Basel. Monumenta Conciliorum, III, p. 449Google Scholar. The Papal legate Jaeobus, was nevertheless on hand to press his ease before the Electtors in early February. RTA, XV, No. 71Google Scholar. On his return to Italy the nnfortnnate man was kidnapped by Siegfried of Zülnhard and only freed through the mediatory efforts of the Count of Württemberg. Sattler, C. F., Geschichte des Herzogtums Würtemberg unter der Eegierung der Graven (Ulm, 1765), II, p. 127.Google Scholar
9. Electoral activity gravely threatened the papal cause. A synod called at Asehaffenburg for August 16, 1440, by Dietrich of Mainz sought to achieve a unanimous endorsement of the Council of Basel. Pückert, op. cit., p. 162; Bessler, H., Die Stellung der deutschen Universitäten zum Baseler Konzil, zum Schisma und zur deutschen Neutralität. Inaugural dissertation—Leipzig (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 45–53Google Scholar. A second synod called by Dietrieh of Cologne rejected the concept of secular neutrality but left the schism itself untouched. See RTA, XV, No. 258, Article 4Google Scholar. It was evident that the popularity of the concept of princely neutrality was at a low ebb. A united ecclesiastical policy on the part of the princes was improbable, however, since each tended to define his relationship to the church on an individual basis.
10. Kink, B., Geschichte der Kaiserlichen Univerität zu Wien, (Wien, 1854), I, 2, p. 69Google Scholar; Zeibig, H. J., “Beitrhge zur Geschiehte der Wirksamkeit des Basler Coneils in Osterreich,” Sitsungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historisehe Classe, VIII (04, 1852), 614.Google Scholar
11. Chniel, J. (ed.), Regesta Friderici III, Romanorum Imperatoris (Vienna 1859), No. 146.Google Scholar
12. RTA, XV, No. 292, Article 6e.Google Scholar
13. Ibid., No. 274.
14. The Pope's offer, presented by Nicholas of Cusa, was designed to appeal to a greedy Elector. Jacob had not yet paid the papacy for the right to Ms Arehbishoprie, a debt which he had pledged to pay by September or early October, 1440. Cusa's proposal was simple. If the Elector supported Eu- genius IV, all his debt as well as the fines incurred by non-payment would be cancelled. Rossmann, W., Betrachtungen ¨ber das Zeitalter der Reformation (Jena, 1858), pp. 380–381Google Scholar. In order to reap the fullest benefit from his political investment, Engenius stipulated that the final release from the financial obligations would only come if the Archbishop could persuade the other Electors to pledge their obedience also. RTA, XV, No. 314Google Scholar. Eugenius offered a second inducement. Jacob had been thwarted in his attempt to have his brother, Philip of Sierek, succeed him as Prior of Würzburg. Eugenius now promised to reverse the verdict if the Archbishop would support him. Herre, H. (ed.), Concilium Basiliense (Basel, 1910), VII, pp. LIII–LVGoogle Scholar; RTA, XV, No. 317.Google Scholar
15. Shortly after the Diet had been transferred from Nuremberg to Mainz, Diether made an effort to influence the other electors towards declaring obedience to Eugenius IV. RTA, No. 357, Article 2.
16. Goldast, M., Collectio Constitutionum Imperialium (Frankfort, 1613), I, pp. 403–407Google Scholar; Lünig, J. C., Deutsches Reichsarchiv (Leipzig, 1710), II, pp. 32–37Google Scholar; Müller, J. J., Reichstagstheatrum (Jena, 1713), pp. 52–56.Google Scholar
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18. Bishop Silvester of Chiemsee observed “…doeh ward bey dem Tag vil sach für sich genomen des Reichs uad sunder der heiligen Kirchen notdurft, vndauch aus alien andern vmbstendten und notdurften vil geredt, und ward auch da nichts zu end besiossen…” Kollar, A. F. (ed.), Analecta Monumentorumomis aevi Vindobonensia (Vienna, 1762), II, p. 1044.Google Scholar
19. The electors conferred with Eugenius during March and April, 1442, at which time the Pope accepted the electoral stipulations which had heen drawn up at Mainz. Eugenius acknowledged the supreme authority of the Council and promised to summon a new assembly at the earliest possible convenience. RTA, XVI, Nos. 120, 121Google Scholar. These bulls expressed the expedient nature of the Pontiff's political strategy rather than the increasing tension between the Electors and the Emperor. Pückert, op. cit., p. 171; Baehmann, op. cit., pp. 91–92. While the legates of Eugenius were conferring with the Electors in the west, Cardinal Julian Cesarini met with Frederick III at Innsbruck, where the Emperor had stopped enroute to his coronation at Aaehen. Monumenta Conciliorum, III, pp. 978–979Google Scholar. Once Frederick bad reached the Rhine region, another legate, the Bishop of Lütich consulted with him. The exact nature of the talks cannot be determined, for the letter of Eugenius to Dietrieh of Cologne on the matter spoke only in very general terms. Hansen, J., Westfalen uad Rheinland im 15. Jahrhundert (Publieationen aus den k. Preussisehen Staatsarchiven, Vol. 34, Leipzig, 1888,) Urkunden und Akten, No. 53.Google Scholar
20. RTA, XVI, No. 231.Google Scholar
21. The term is left untranslated because of its multiple connotations. Its 1442 usage relates to all the orders or states of the Empire not included in any electoral territory.
22. Ibid., No. 231, Articles 15–15f.
23. Ibid., No. 221, Dated at Frankfort on July 30, 1442.
24. Bachmann, op. cit., Beilagen, No. VIII; RTA, XVI, No. 223.Google Scholar
25. RTA, XVI, No. 226.Google Scholar
26. Ibid., No. 222.
27. In accordance with the idea that no new policies could be legislated until the forthcoming Council established a new operational basis, Frederick declared his adherence to the Protestation of March 17, 1438, Ibid., No. 230.
28. For a more detailed account of the dispute see RTA, XVIII, Nos. 23–29.Google Scholar
29. Ibid., No. 29.
30. The Frankfort Diet had sent commissions to the contending church parties. These were scheduled to give a report of their findings to a new Diet at Nuremberg. Ibid., No. 229, Article 4.
31. Hufnagel, O., “Kaspar Schliek als Kanzler Friedrichs III,” Mittheilungen des Instituts für Osterreichische Geschichtsforschuag, Ergänzungsband VIII (1911), Beilagen, No. 3, 457–59.Google Scholar
32. RTA, XVII, No. 101, Articles 6 and 7.Google Scholar
33. For a further discussion of this aspect see Gerber, H., “Frankfurt a.M. und der Reichskrieg gegen die Armagnaken, 1444–45,” Archive Für Frankfurts Geschichte und Kunst, Folge 4, IV (1933), 49–79Google Scholar; Thommen, R., “Friedensverträge und Bünde der Eidgenossenschaft mit Frankreich, 1444- 1777,” Basler Zeitschift für Geschichte und Attertumskunde, XV (1916), 119–129.Google Scholar
34. The document was used by Pückert, op. cit., pp. 216–217 and is listed in RTA, XVII, No. 184Google Scholar. It was probably lost or destroyed during World War II. Pückert implied that the declaration was issued near the close of the Nuremberg deliberations and represented the last positive effort on the part of the imperial court and the electorate to solve the ecclesiastical problems of the time. A joint declaration of this nature did not fit the temperament and setting of mid-October, since separatistic tendencies of the electoral camp allowed no united policy at this time. The united desire for an end to neutrality was a manifestation of the early enthusiasm which characterized the Diet. Frederick's decree was a later formulation of this early attitude.
35. Bachmann, op. cit., Beilage, No. XIV, pp. 230–231.
36. The electoral counter-proposals were also presented on October 1, 1444, shortly after the imperial pronouncement. Ibid., Beilage, No. XV, pp. 231–33.
37. The official copies of the decree were preserved in both Latin and German. RTA, XVII, No. 193Google Scholar; Gerbert, M., Historia Nigrae Silvae Ordinis Sancti Benedicti Coloniae (Freiburg, 1788), III, p. 357Google Scholar. The document is registered in Chmel, Regesta, No. 1783.
38. Unofficially usurping the imperial prerogative the Electors of Cologne and Treves and the representatives of the Archbishops of Magdeburg, Bremen, and Salzburg, as well as those of the Electors of the Palatinate and Saxony scheduled a meeting for December 8, 1445. Its avowed purpose involved the termination of electoral neutrality. Bachmann, op. cit., p. 140.
39. Wolkan, B., Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini (Vol. LXI of Fontes Rerum Austriacarum. Diplomataria et Acta. Vienna, 1909), I, 2, Nos. XXX-XXXII.Google Scholar
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41. In optimistic response to the electoral endorsement it had recently received, the Council reminded Frederick of the enthusiasm with which it had always supported his actions. This obvious bid for imperial support found little response. Chmel, J., Materialien zur Osterreichischen Geschichte Aus Archiven und Bibliotheken (Vienna, 1837), I, a, No. LIII.Google Scholar
42. Gragg, F.A., “The Commentaries of Pius II,” Smith College Studies in History, XXII, 33–35.Google Scholar
43. The pact really consisted of three mutual defense treaties. They were signed between the French and Cologne (Lacomblet, op. cit., IV, No. 255, pp. 307–308), Trier (Hontheim, J.N., Historia Trevirensis Diplomatica et Pragmatica (Vienna, 1750), II, 816, pp. 398–399)Google Scholar, and Saxony (Dumont, J., Corps Universel Diplomatic du Droit des Gens (Cologne, 1869), III, 1, p. 127)Google Scholar. Religious issues motivated none of these pacts. Frederick of Saxony had lost territory to Philip of Burgundy, while Jacob of Treves needed aid against the rebellious city of Soest.
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45. Pückert, op. cit., pp. 236–239. The Frankfort deliberations represented the failure of a whole series of electoral negotiations with France. Electoral policy was momentarily bankrupt.
46. Frederick's distrust of the Electors was well justified. On October 22, 1445, a marriage contract between Count Lewis of the Palatinate and Margaretha of Savoy was negotiated by the Archbishops of Cologne and Treves. Dumont, op. cit, No. 95. Through this marriage Count Lewis became a potential mediator between the Electors and the French. In addition to this princely consultation at Leipzig and Boppard in the fall of 1445 produced renewed endorsement of the Council of Basel. Pückert, op. cit., pp. 220–222, 232.
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50. Günther, W. (ed.), Codex Diplomaticus Rheno-Mosseflanus (Coblenz, 1825), IV, No. 217, pp. 453–461Google Scholar; Müller, op. cit., I, 276–282, 312; Gudenus, V. F. (ed.), Codex Diplomaticus Anecdotorum Res Moguntinas Illustrantium (Göttingen. 1743), IV, pp. 290–298Google Scholar; Brockhaus, C., Gregor von Heimburg: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Geschichte des 15. Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, 1861), pp. 59–60.Google Scholar
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52. In his account of the matter, Eugenins wrote “Cumque res diu inutiliter tractaretur, ad pecunim tandem recurrere oportet, cui rarae obaudiunt aures. Race Domina curiarum est, haec aures omnium aperit, huic omnia serviunt, Haec quoque Maguntinum expugnavit.” Kollar, op. cit., p. 127. Pückert treats the story of bribery as a fable, but his arguments against it are not conclusive. op. cit., pp. 281–84.
53. Gragg, op. cit., p. 40.
54. Mansi, J. P., Pii II PM. olim Aeneae Syhvii Piccolominei Senensis, Orationes Politicae, et Ecclesiasticae (Luca, 1755), p. 108.Google Scholar
55. Ravnoldus, O., Annales Ecclesiastici (Barri-Ducis, 1874), ad an 1447, Nos. 5–7Google Scholar: Mereati, A., Raccolta di Concordati su Materie Ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede e le Autorità Civili (Rome, 1919), p. 168ff.Google Scholar
56. Aenens' account of the matter is preserved in a letter to Frederick III. Muratori, L. A., Rerum Itahicarum Scriptores (Milan. 1784), III, 2, p 889.Google Scholar
57. Ibid., p. 895: Christophe, J. B., His-loire de la Papauté pendant le XV. Siècle avec des Pièces Justificatives (Lyon, 1863), I, p. 372.Google Scholar
58. Hefele, J., Conciliengeschichte (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1869), VII, pp. 837–838.Google Scholar
59. Aeneas Sylvius was sent on a special mission to win over Dietrich. At Cologne he was regarded by the University as an apostate. Aeneas found it necessary to justify himself in a letter addressed to the rector of the institution. His apology exemplifies his characteristic shrewdness. Pea, C., Pius II Port. Max. a Calumniis Vindicatus (Rome, 1823), pp. 1–16Google Scholar. A copy of the bull finalizing the Vienna Concordat reached the Archbishop soon afterwards.
60. Müller, op. cit., pp. 355–375.
61. Chmel, , Regesta, Anhang, pp. XCIV–XCVI.Google Scholar
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63. See the letter of Pope Calixtus III to Frederick III in Werminghoff, A., Nationalkirchliche Bestrebungen im Deutschen Mittebabter, (Stuttgart. 1910), p. 108.Google Scholar
64. In a strict interpretation of canon law, the Papacy still retained its right to investitures, taxation and general control of the Church. The Concordat only represented a voluntary curtailment of these rights.
65. The idea of a centralized Papacy as a prerequisite to religious unity survived despite the Schism, conciliarism and such political pamphleteering as sought to derive authority from popular sovereignty. The theoretical revival of imperial absolutism by such figures as Antonio Rosellis, Aeneas Sylvius, Turrecremata, and Petrus de Monte still thought of papal centralism as a collateral of imperial supremacy, even though the nature of the relationship was subject to varying degrees of in terpretation. Eckermann, K., Studien zur Geschichte des monarchischen Gedctnkens im 15. Jahrhundert (BerlinGrunewald, 1933), pp. 91–94, 107–111.Google Scholar
66. Utility and expediency were characteristic features of pre-1448 diplomacy. Opportunities for such aetion were rooted in tbe lack of a central power as well as in the anarchistic nature of the later Council of Basel. In reaction to the assertiveness of the lower clergy at Basel the higher ecclesiastics and princes first used it as a weapon of diplomacy then, having attained their aims, abandoned it to its fate. The frequent reference to the Council in the multiple intrigues of the Electors cannot therefore be interpreted as a princely loyalty to conciliarism.
67. Bertrams, op. cit., p. 191.
