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² Diop, Momar Coumba and Diouf, Mamadou, “Statutory Political Successions: An After-word,” CODESRIA Bulletin (Dakar), no. 3 (1991), 8Google Scholar. Bakary, Tessy D., “Des militaires aux avocats: une autre forme de coup d'état ‘la conférence nationale souveraine’”Google Scholar (n.d.) offers a comparative analysis that looks at Spain's transition to democracy. For a cultural analysis, see Boulaga, F. Ebousi, Les Conférences nationales en Afrique noire (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1993).Google Scholar

³ Herschelle Challenor reminded me that the Beninese have been politically innovative in the past, such as the time when they created a rotating presidency to allow for equity in geographical representation.

⁴ This is the research challenge posed by Rustow, Dankwart in “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, 2 (04 1970), 337–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Robinson, Pearl T., “Democratization: Understanding the Relationship between Regime Change and the Culture of Politics,” African Studies Review, 37 (04 1994), 39–67, examines recent Africanist literature on transitions.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ O'Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C., Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), 15–36Google Scholar; and Karl, Terry Lynn, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics, 23 (10 1990), 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ O'Donnell, and Schmitter, , Tentative Conclusions, 37–47Google Scholar; and Karl, Terry, “Getting to Democracy: A Research Perspective,” The Transition to Democracy, Proceedings of a Workshop (Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 1991), 29–38.Google Scholar

⁷ Bratton, Michael and Walle, Nicolas van de, “Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa,” in Hyden, Goran and Bratton, Michael, eds., Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Press, 1991), 27–56Google Scholar; Tarrow, Sidney, “Aiming at a Moving Target: Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe,” PS 24 (March 1991), 12–20Google Scholar; and Przeworski, Adam, “The ‘East’ Becomes the ‘South’? The ‘Autumn of the People’ and the Future of Eastern Europe,” j, 24 (03 1991), 20–24. Although a Conferência Nacional held December 5–7, 1989, in former Portuguese Sāo Tomé was not declared sovereign, the single-party regime organizing the conference approved the introduction of parliamentary democracy two weeks after a majority of participants had urged the action.Google Scholar

⁸ Huntington, Samuel, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) is notable for its conceptual breadth and regional scope.Google Scholar

⁹ Chatterjee, Partha, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1986).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Benin: Synthèse de la Conference National 19–28 Février 1989 (distributed by Radiodiffusion Television Benin, Cotonou).

¹¹ Bourdieu, Pierre, trans. by Nice, Richard, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Ibid., 73.

¹³ O'Donnell, and Schmitter, , Transitions, 4–5.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Bourdieu, , Outline, 72.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Historian Patrick Manning argues that the drama of 1789 may have been Africanized and indigenized in the minds of some Beninese elites as early as World War I, when, with “symbolic dexterity,” they began to emphasize “the republican tradition in French politics” while criticizing the flagrant abuses of colonial rule as “reflecting the excesses of the old regime.” Manning, Patrick, “The Clash of Empire and Republic in Francophone African Politics” (Paper presented to the University of Pennsylvania Africanists, 04 1, 1988).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Ortner, Sherry B., “Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 26:1 (1984), 149, 153–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Ortner, Sherry B., High Religion: A Cultural and Political History of Sherpa Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 16.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid., 193.

¹⁹ Ibid., 195.

²⁰ Ortner, , High Religion, 60Google Scholar. See also, for example, Geertz, Clifford, Negara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)Google Scholar, and Sahlins, M., Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ Ortner, , High Religion, 128.Google Scholar

²² Ibid.

²³ Ortner, , High Religion, 200–1.Google Scholar

²⁴ Diop, Momar Coumba, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa,” CODESRIA Bulletin, no. 3 (1991), 2–7.Google Scholar

²⁵ The Union of West African Journalists, created in 1986, is headquartered in Dakar. It includes associations of news professionals from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Siena Leone, and Togo. One of its key objectives is promoting the public's right to accurate and informative news.

²⁶ PANOS is an international network of independent journalists specializing in issues affecting the environment and development. It has ninety-seven member countries, divided into four regional networks with institutes in London, created in 1986, to cover Asia and Anglophone Africa; Washington D.C., 1988, the Latin America network; Paris, 1988, Francophone Africa; and Budapest 1990, the countries of the East. See Panos-UJOA, , L'état de la presse en Afrique de l'Ouest francophone (Paris: Panos, 1991)Google Scholar and Panos, Institut, Presse Francophone d'Afrique: vers le pluralisme (Paris: L'Hansiattan, 1991).Google Scholar

²⁷ For an overview and analysis of these reforms, see Bratton, and Walle, van de, “Popular Protest and Political Reform.”Google Scholar

²⁸ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development, E/ECA/CM.16/11 (March 1990).

²⁹ Chirac, a member of the center-right party, Rassemblement du Peuple Républicain, served as prime minister of France from March 1986 to June 1988, the period of governance referred to as “co-habitation” because the Socialist Party's François Mitterrand was president of the Republic.

³ O “Il ne faut pas confondre pluripartisme et démocratie estime Chirac, M.,” Le Monde (Paris, 27 février 1990), p. 7Google Scholar; and Bourgi, Albert, “Jacques Chirac et le sens de l'histoire,” Jeune Afrique, no. 1523 (Mars 1990), 18.Google Scholar

³¹ Bayart, Jew-François, La politique africaine de Francois Mitterrand (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1984), 140–5Google Scholar. It should be noted that the Maghreb, though formerly under French dominion, is not an integral part of this system of Franco-African hegemony. For an introduction to the history of the region, see Manning, Patrick, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa: 1880–1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

³² Collectif de réalisation de l'encyclopédie politique, économique, social et culturelle de I'Afrique contemporaine.

³³ See, for example, Amin, Samir, Neo-colonialism in West Africa (Monthly Review Press, 1973).Google Scholar

³⁴ Kraft, Charles, “The Political Economy of the CFA Franc Zone: Advantages, Disadvantages, Dependency and Regional Integration,” Hemispheres, 15 (Spring 1991), 109–28.Google Scholar

³⁵ The policy, called Le Tiers-Mondisme, included support for the notion of a New International Economic Order; increased public aid for development; a preference for multilateral aid; the globalization of French cooperation beyond its former colonies; an emphasis on investments in energy, small-scale industries, food self-sufficiency, and the satisfaction of basic human needs; and human rights advocacy.

³⁶ Mitterand's first presidential visit to Africa was to Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal. In Senegal he failed to make a promised speech on human rights and democracy, an omission which set the pattern for his presidency. Edwige LeClercq, Tiers-Mondisme: Bridge Building and the Creation of the New Left in French Politics (Ph.D. disser., MIT, 1992), analyses the political cleavages on the French Left that underlie the failure of this policy.

³⁷ This practice, which began before the Socialists took power, got maximum exposure when President Bokasa of Central Africa was found to have given uncut diamonds to French President Giscard d'Estaing. See Bayant, , La politigue africaine de Mitterrand, 22Google Scholar and 141; Jean-François Medard, “The Patrimonialization of Franco-African Relations: Political Exchanges, Economic Exchanges, and Social Exchanges” (Paper for workshop on “Changing Forms and Dimensions of Public Corruption,” University of Leyden, 04 2–8, 1993)Google Scholar; “France: Let's all open our purses,” The Economist (London, 01 9, 1988), p. 36; personal communications.Google ScholarPubMed

³⁸ I wish to thank Patrick Manning for sharing with me the historian's insight on the significance of the French Revolution in the political etymology of transparency. Transparency, one of the basic concepts in the contemporary literature on democratization, is seen as a way of preventing corruption and promoting economic efficiency through access to information. Latin Americanists use the term to talk about transitions from military rule to civilian government. And it has been picked up by the World Bank and other donor agencies as one of the criteria for aid with political conditions. For a discussion of the political language of transparency, see Hunt, Lynn, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)Google Scholar, and The World Bank, Governance and Development (Washington, D.C.: 1992).Google Scholar

³⁹ Assemblée Nationale Française, lère séance, 2 février 1988, p. 5.

⁴⁰ “Les ‘Africans’ de la France,” Jeune Afrique. no. 1537 (13 au 19 Juin 1990), 20–22.

⁴¹ Presidential elections held on October 25, 1992, were suspended in midstream by a government decree citing “technical” shortcomings. According to poll watchers, Kolingba was running fourth in a five-person race. A ruling from the Supreme Court handed down October 28 upheld the decree postponing the elections.

⁴² Bayart, J-F, “La problématique de la démocratie en Afrique noire: La Baule, et puis après?” Politique Africaine, 43 (10 1991), 5–20.Google Scholar

⁴³ “Droits de l'homme …,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris, Juillet 1990), p. 4.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ “There can be no development without democracy, ad no democracy without development” (Mitterand, quoted in “Le seizème sommet franco-africain de La Baule,” Le Monde [20 Juin 1990], p. 5).Google Scholar See also, Wauthier, Claude in “‘Démocratie’, ‘développement’, ces mots pièges,“ Le Monde Diplomatique (Juillet 1990), p. 4.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ When elements of Zaire's army mutinied and went on a rampage of pillaging, France and Belgium sent paratroopers to protect their citizens' lives and property. The United States, which considered Mobutu a dependable ally for nearly twenty years, began to encourage political pluralism but demurred at the prospect of Mobutu's removal from office.

⁴⁶ The scenario was slightly different in Mali, where President Traoré was ousted by a coup d'état before the national conference convened. See Table 1.

⁴⁷ Diallo, Siradiou, ”France-Afrique: l'héritage de 1789,“ Jeune Afrique, no. 1489 (Juillet 1989), 32–33.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Girard, Patrick, “Bicentenaire: Que la fête commence!,” Jeune Afrique, no. 1489 (19 Juillet 1989), 4–11;Google Scholar and Internet, Human Rights, HRI Reporter, 14 (Summer/Autumn 1991), 103.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Hountondji was one of the key strategists of the Benin National Conference, drafting many of the resolutions adopted by the participants. Tevoedjre was the rapporteur for the National Conference. See Tevoedjre, Albert, “Nous avons vaincu la fatalité,” Rapport général de synthèse de la conférence des forces vives de la nation(Cotonou: 19–28Février 1990).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Trevorje, Albert, keynote address at a conference on “Democratization, Human Rights and Development in Africa: Lessons for the 21st Century” (Lincoln University, PA, 04 1–3, 1992). The PSPC's symposium paralleled a strikingly similar event in Haiti. From December 5–8, 1989, the Haitian Society of History and Geography hosted a conference on “Haiti et la Révolution Française: Filiation, Rupture, Nouvelle Dimensions” in Port-of-Prince. The presidential elections that swept Jean-Baptiste Aristide into power were held in December 1990.Google Scholar

⁵¹ The declaration of sovereignty distinguishes national conferences from events, such as the intermittent joumées de dialogues held in Côte d'Ivoire. In these dialogues, President Boigny informed or consulted but never conceded power to the people.

⁵² Schama, Simon, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York:Vintage Books, 1989), 288.Google Scholar

⁵³ This summary of events is based on the accounts presented in Doyle, William, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)Google Scholar, chs. 3 and 4, and Lefebvre, Georges, The Coming of the French Revolution 1789, Palmer, R. R., trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1957).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Annual interest on the national debt rose from 20 percent of current revenues in 1753 to nearly 60 percent by 1764 (Schama, Citizens, 62–79).

⁵⁵ Lefebvre, , The Coming, p. 64.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ “Le Président du Présidium, le Professeur André Salifou,” Sahel Dimanche (Niamey, 9 août 1991), p. 7.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ For a review of the aftermath of the national conferences, see Francis Kpatindé, “Démocratisation: bilan des années folles,” Jeune Afrique, no. 1628 (19–25 mars 1992), 20–24.

⁵⁸ Quoted without attribution by Soudan, François, “France-Afrique: le bateau ivre,” Jeune Afrique, no. 1623 (13–19 février 1992), 21Google Scholar. This phrase echoes Bayart's earlier statement that Africans had to “invent a strategy for democratization” (“Introduction,” Polilique Africaine, [10 1991]).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Robinson, Pearl T., “Grassroots Participation under Military Governance in Burkina Faso and Niger,” in Hyden, and Bratton, , eds., Governance and Politics in Africa, 143–65, argues that legitimation problems may provide the dynamic for certain kinds of liberalizing reforms.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ The case for the convergence of internal political factors and external economic factors was being made by Nigerien economist Garba Bello Tiousso at least a year before the national conference convened “Arguments en faveur du multipartisme” [mimeo, n.d.], and other papers written by Tiousso circulated clandestinely until liberalizing reforms allowed for more open political debate.

⁶¹ In precolonial times, the Touareg politically dominated the southern regions of the Sahara Desert. They sustained armed resistance against French colonial rule into the 1920s. As a nomadic ethnic community dispersed across present-day Niger, Mali, Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania, their lifestyle is at odds with the territorial boundaries of the post-colonial state. The Touaregs have born the brunt of the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s and have been politically marginalized by governments intent on sedantarizing nomadic populations. With help from Libya's Colonel Khadaffri beginning in the 1970s, some Touaregs formed armed opposition groups [see Touaregs, , Exil et Résistance, La Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée, 57 (1990)].Google Scholar For an analysis of the complexities of the Khadaffi connection, see Robinson, Pearl T., “Playing the Arab Card: Niger and Chad's Ambivalent Relations with Libya,” in Bruce Arlinghaus, African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 171–84.Google Scholar

⁶² This account is based on the investigation conducted by the national conference. Conférence National du Niger, Commission spéciale des crimes et abus politiques, “Rapport de synthèse des évennements dits de Tchintabaraden” (mimeo).

⁶³ “Doléances du ler mai 1990, ” Ma'Aykaci (1990), 11–14.

⁶⁴ Maidoka, Aboubacar, “La Constitution Nigérienne du 24 Septembre 1989,” Revue Juridique et Politique, 2 (Mai-09 1991), 113–32.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Robinson, Pearl T., “Niger: Anatomy of a Neotraditional Corporatist State,” Comparative Politics, 10 1991, 1–20.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ During the colonial period, the syndicalist, Djibo Bakary, was in the forefront of the nationalist struggle. But with the consolidation of a one-party state by President Diori Hamani and the Parti Progressiste Nigérien (PPN), Djibo and his party were outlawed, and the unions were reorganized and brought under party control. After Diori's ouster in a 1974 coup d'état, the new military regime imposed its authority on the unions by pulling them into a corporatist structure.

⁶⁷ Mainassara, Boureima, Pratiques Syndicales et Conscience de Classes au Niger, Tombe II (Niamey: L'Imprimerie National du Niger, 1989), 79–85. Until July 1981, the USTN held the presidency of the Social Security Trust Fund. A structural adjustment program went into effect that year, and the USTN was removed from the presidency by decree of the Council of Ministers.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Souley, Abdoulaye Niandou, “Syndicalisme et Politique au Niger (1978–1991),” Haske (Niamey), no. 20 (18–25 septembre 1991), p. 16.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ The adjustment program launched in 1985 involved price liberalization, the elimination of government monopolies, privatization or liquidation of roughly half the parastatals, and rehabilitation of the remainder.

⁷⁰ Decoudras, Pierre-Maire, “L'aide internationale,” Politique Africaine, 38 (06 1990), 88. Debt ceased rising with the forgiveness of all commercial debt in 1991, but the debt service ratio continued to hover in the 30 to 35 percent range.Google Scholar

⁷¹ The International Monetary Fund, Niger (Staff Report, June 1992), Table 2.

⁷² Liman, Kiari, “Crise économique et ajustement structurel (1982–1988),” Politique Africaine, 38 (06 1990), 76–86.Google Scholar

⁷³ Diallo, Siradiou, “Le multipartisme contre la crise,” Jeune Afrique Bis (24 11-4 12 1990), 45.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ USIN, “Déclariation de Politique Général de 1'U.S.T.N. à la Conférence Nationale,” PP. 1–2.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ République du Niger, loi no. 91–002 du 24 avril 1991, portant révision de la Constitution du 24 septembre 1989.

⁷⁶ République du Niger. Présiderice de la République, Décret No 91–075/PRN du 4 mai 1991 portant créatiori et attributions d'une Commission Préparatoire de la Conférence Nationale. The two unaffiliated unions, the Syndicat National des Enseignants et Chercheurs du Supérieur (SNECS) and the Syndicat National de l'Administration Diplomatiques (SNAD), represent university instructors and researchers, and agents with the diplomatic corps.

⁷⁷ This synopsis of events surrounding the women's march is compiled from République du Niger, Commission Nationale Préparatoire de Ia Coriférience Nationale (CNPCN), Résultat des Travaux Niamey, du 13 mai au 17 juin 1991, pp. 4–20; an interview with Bagna Aïssata Fall, president of the Women's Co-ordinating Committee, published in the newspaper, Haske, 1–30 May 1991, p. 5; and conversations with several of the participants.

⁷⁸ In discussions with some of the protesters, I learned that the idea of organizing a demonstration emerged spontaneously at the closing session of a UNESCO-sponsored seminar on the role of women in development. Fortuitously, this.event was held in Niamey on the eve of the planning commission's first session. The contradiction between the lofty resolutions about the importance of women to the development process and the near absence of women from the democratization process was too blatant for the participants to ignore.

⁷⁹ Initially the preparatory commission had 7 representatives each from the government, the USTN, the USN and the business and management sector; 2 representatives each for 18 political parties; and 2 each for the 2 professional unions not affiliated with the USTN.

⁸⁰ Two members of the commission supported the demand for women's representatives but were overruled by the majority opinion.

⁸¹ République du Niger, loi no. 91–005 du 20 mai 1991 relative aux partis politiques, states that no political party could be based “exclusively on religious, language or regional affiliation;” nor could parties organize to promote the objectives of people “belonging to the same sex, ethnic group, or professional status.” Here again the French Revolution offers a relevant historical analogy. The Convention outlawed women's clubs in 1793.

⁸² At this stage of the transition process, the National Assembly was still comprised entirely of MNSD deputies. If the regime had truly wanted to take a stand in defense of women's rights, the legislature was the one arena in which President Saibou still had the votes to win.

⁸³ Among the observer delegates, 50 slots were allocated to aid donors, 10 to the international press, 2 to the African League of Human Rights, and 2 to the Association of African Jurists.

⁸⁴ Adam, El Back, “La Polemique des quotas: une question de logique,” Haske no. 16, 1–15 août 1991, p. 14;Google Scholar and Abdourahmane, Soli, Conférence Nationale du Niger (Niamey: Impremerie des Arts Graphiques du Niger, n.d.), 34–48.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ The number 64 was calculated on the basis of Niger's administrative districts: one delegate each for 34 ariondissements, 22 communes, and 8 departements.

⁸⁶ Is the tennis court analogy with the Estates-General's merely fortuitous?

⁸⁷ Niger, Conférence Nationale, Act II: Reglement Intérieur.

⁸⁸ Despite the gross representational asymmetry, only the Nigerien human rights group Democracy Liberty and Development (DLD) and a few lawyers criticized the compromise.

⁸⁹ Niger, Conférence Nationale, Act III, 9 aotlt 1991.

⁹⁰ CNPCN, Résultat des Travaux, pp. 4–20.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Besides the special commission on Political Crimes and Abuses, there were commissions on Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, and Socio-Cultural Affairs.

⁹² Only 24 of Power's 100 delegates participated in the tally. Cheiffou received 23 of those voting but fell far short of the 51 supporters needed to win Power's vote.

⁹³ Mariama Banakoye was named Minister of Civil Service, and Aissata Bagna became Minister of Social Development, Population and Women's Affairs. Mme. Bagna had been the president of the women's coordinating committee during the pre-conference protests.

⁹⁴ This summary represents the way in which Nigeriens dramatized the cultural schema. The analysis would have to be done on a state-by-state basis to determine whether, and in precisely what ways, other Francophone Africans enacted the script.

⁹⁵ The lack of the French connection explains in part why President Mobutu of Zaire was able to refuse to yield authority to a national conference for more than a year. He insisted that the conference would not be empowered to make constitutional changes and contended that only the President could name a prime minister (Shiner, Cindy, “Mobutu Blocks Zaire Democracy Moves,” Africa News [06 22-07 5, 1992], pp. 1, 4).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ “Nicéphore Soglo: l'an I dans la douleur,” Jeune Afrique, no. 1629 (26 mars-1 avril 1992), 22–24.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Mali's transition government signed a peace accord with political representatives of its nomadic Touaregs in April 1992, but sporadic skirmishes continued.

⁹⁸ Kpatindé, , “Tension persistante au Togo,” Jeune Afrique, no. 1621 (30 janvier-4 février 1992).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Kpatindé, , “Paix des braves à Niamey,” Jeune Afrique, no. 1632 (16–22 avril 1992), 24–25. The politically amputated President, General Saibou, helped negotiate an end to the army mutiny. He also asked Côte d'Ivoire's President Houphouet-Boigny, who was vacationing in France, to intervene with the French government to transfer money to Niger to pay salaries.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Thiam, Jean-Bruno, “Congo: après les états généraux de l'armée,” Jeune Afrique, no. 1629 (26 mars-ler avril 1992), 26–27.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Ortner, , High Religion, 18.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Robinson, Pearl T., Transitions: Corporatism, Pluralism, and the Cultural Dynamics of Regime Change in Niger (forthcomine).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Chatterjee, , Nationalist Thought, 170.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ The World Bank's 1991 Niger report forecasts no increase in consumer income through 1998.