¹ Smith, Donald Eugene, India as a Secular State (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar $10.00. pp. xix +518.

² I have reproduced this definition in a schematic form which combines two versions, both found on page 4.

³ For a pessimistic pre-Independence premonition of intolerant Hindu establishment, see Bates, M.S., Religious Liberty: an Inquiry (Harper, 1945), pp. 57–58.Google Scholar

⁴ Professor Smith attributes to the British the introduction of “the revolutionary principle that it was within the province of the state to regulate and change society by legislation” (p. 304, author's italics). This should be qualified to account for the traditional practice of lending governmental support to efforts for self-reform on the part of groups within the society. The novelty is not so much in the notion of deliberate change as in the relevant unit to be changed and the relevant agency to initiate it.

⁵ While such a formula might lend itself to judicial application, it is surely no more intellectually satisfying than the “sharp distinction” between secular and religious which Professor Smith finds “simply untenable” (see text above at p. 136) or the sophistic “ingenious interpretations” of the Courts, which he approves only as a temporary expedient. (See note 24 below.)

⁶ The objection to the pollution or ritual impurity of the “untouchable” is, of course, the same in restaurants as in temples. For Professor Smith, these laws “represent two fundamentally different categories of legislation” (p. 241), apparently because the temple is a “religious institution”. One wonders whether this includes buildings only or includes e.g., a “sacred” river.

⁷ Cf. note 36, below.

⁸ Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 29(2), 28(3). [All citations to articles are to this Constitution unless otherwise indicated.]

⁹ Professor Smith does not indicate why “indirect” subsidization of religion is unacceptable while indirect (i.e., “incidental”) interference with religion is permissable. (See p. 137 above.) Does not the valid secular purpose which legitimates incidental interference do the same for incidental subsidization?

¹⁰ See In re Kerela Education Bill, 1957, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956 at 980–81.

¹¹ Other provisions (besides those quoted in the text below) of the Indian Constitution which embody the second (group protection) approach to minorities are Article 28(2) which exempts endowed institutions administered by the state from the prohibition of religious instruction in educational institutions maintained out of state funds [for an analogous American ruling, see Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908)]; Art. 29(1) which provides that any section of citizens with a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right to conserve it; the provisions of Part XVI which provide special treatment for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; Arts. 350A and 350B which give rights to linguistic minorities.

¹² These provisions are mentioned in passing when discussing government interference with the operation of private schools (pp. 361–71), but are not discussed in the context of minority rights (p. 405 et seq.). Except for the Kerela Education Bill case, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956, the developing judicial protection of these rights is ignored. See Rev. Sidharajbhai Sabbaj v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 540; State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society, 17 S.CJ. 678 (1954); Dipendra Nath v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 Patna 101; Arya Pratinidhi Sabha v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 Patna 359; Chaudhury, Subrota Roy, “Cultural and Educational Rights of Indian Minorities as Judicially Interpreted”, Public Law, Vol. 6, 271–88 (08., 1961).Google Scholar

¹³ See Article 27 which forbids tax monies to be appropriated “for the promotion or maintainance of any particular religion …” (Emphasis supplied). Presumably the state is not prohibited from non-discriminatory financial support of religion. Cf. Article 28(2).

¹⁴ Perhaps such questions cannot be answered unless some version of Hindu beliefs and practices are considered authoritative or standard. For what promotes one set of beliefs and practices within Hinduism may be detrimental to another set. E.g., dissemination of Brahmanic ritual may detract from sects built around heterodox reformers — and vice versa. Presumably most instances of “promotion” are cases in which some more widespread and prestigious elements within Hinduism are encouraged at the expense of local and unlettered elements. But it might be difficult to determine whether the net effect was to encourage or promote Hinduism.

¹⁵ Unlike Christians, Muslims and Jews, Hindus share no single authoritative canon of scripture. Nor do particular sacred books necessarily stand in the same relation to their Hindu clientele as the New Testament does to Christians or the Qur'ān to Muslims.

¹⁶ Even if a sharp distinction between religious and non-religious experiences were possible, there seems little reason to assume that aesthetic appreciation falls entirely on the non-religious side. One may wonder whether, to the extent that art successfully fuses form and content, appreciation of the “musical form” of, e.g., Gregorian chants is so readily distinguishable from religious experience.

¹⁷ Cf. his observation that in the United States “Christmas has largely become a secularized general festival” and “virtually no one regards [official Christmas celebrations] as an identification of Christianity with the state” (p. 296). For a dissenting view see Pfeffer, , Church, State and Freedom (Boston, 1953), 226.Google Scholar

¹⁸ On the difficulties of distinguishing religious phenomena see Cohn, W., “Is Religion Universal? Problems of Definition”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, II, 26–33Google Scholar (Oct., 1962); Goody, J., “Religion and Ritual: the Definitional Problem”, British Journal of Sociology, XII (06, 1961), 142–64;CrossRefGoogle ScholarStahmer, H., “Defining Religion: Federal Aid and Academic Freedom” in Religion and the Public Order (Chicago, 1964), 116–46.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Outside these fields, governmental use of religious classifications is forbidden. The “personal law” is administered in the government courts; the usefulness of analogies with systems like that of Israel (p. 291), where personal law is applied by separate religious courts, is extremely limited.

²⁰ Even so, many find in Christian teachings inspiration for a wide range of restrictions which they feel a proper subject of governmental enforcement.

²¹ See Hodgson, Marshall G.S., “A Comparison of Islam and Christianity as Frameworks for Religious Life”, Diogenes, No. 32, pp. 49–74 (Winter, 1960), especially p. 63;Google ScholarCallard, K., Pakistan: A Political Study (New York, 1957), Chapter VI.Google Scholar

²² It should be recalled that the so-called regulation of society by “Hinduism” was to a very large extent self-regulation on the part of the component groups that made up society. If “Hinduism” provided widespread and prestigious norms and practices, there was a wide range of choice in each group to adopt so much of these as it felt appropriate, advantageous and acceptable to its neighbors. Cf. Derrett, J.D.M., “Law and the Social Order in India before the Muhammadan Conquests”, J. of Economic and Social History of the Orient, VII (1964), 73–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ The only “medieval” practices mentioned are onerous dowries, divorce by repudiation, and polygamy (the last conceded to be declining due to economic pressures). It is obvious that any or all of these might be remedied without abolishing Muslim law. Cf. the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, in Pakistan. See Coulson, N.J., “Islamic Family Law: Progress in Pakistan” in Anderson, J.N.D., ed., Changing Law in Developing Countries (London, 1963), 240–257.Google Scholar

²⁴ Professor Smith has “absolutely no doubt that such legislation [abolishing polygamy among Hindus while leaving it undisturbed among Muslims] is discriminatory and contrary to Article 15(1)” (p. 116); a court that found otherwise (on the ground that the law applied not to Hindus as a religious group but to those governed previously by Hindu law) “indulged in a bit of pure sophistry” (p. 116). However Professor Smith does not propose that the courts should have declared reforms of religious law unconstitutional. “During this transitional period when India is struggling to become a modern state, it is precisely the function of the courts to concoct such ingenious interpretations in order to harmonize the permanently valid principle, Article 15(1) in this case, with the dynamic urge for social reform which still has to find expression within the antiquated framework of religious ‘civil laws’“ (p. 116).

²⁵ Under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, it is possible for an individual to give up his personal law without relinquishing his religious identification (p. 278). Expansion of this arrangement into a truly voluntary optional civil law for those who do not wish to be ruled by their personal law is an unexplored and promising alternative to the abolition of separate personal laws. For a discussion of the possibilities and problems of having alternative systems of personal law based on individual choice, see Tedeschi, G., Studies in Israel Law (Jerusalem, 1960), 257 ff.Google Scholar

²⁶ See below, p. 151 ff.

²⁷ A great deal of criticism has been directed at the abuses of the principle of “protective discrimination”. It is now clear that the courts will scrutinize carefully both the use of the caste criterion and the extent of the preferences. The case of Keseva Iyengar v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1956 Mys. 20, which allowed runaway application of “protective discrimination” and which Professor Smith cites as a dark portent (p. 121), is clearly no longer good law and has not been for some years. In Ramakrishna Singh v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1960 Mys. 338, a scheme reserving 45% of seats in professional and technical colleges for members of 145 communities designated as “backward classes” was struck down. The High Court there found that the selection of these classes was not based on any intelligible principle for isolating the “socially and educationally backward” to whom preferences may constitutionally be given. In Balaji v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649 (decided after Professor Smith's cut-off date, but referred to by him at p. 320), the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to select backward classes by reference to caste rank or standing. It should be noted, though, that both of these cases allow caste or community to be used as units in selecting the groups that are to be designated as backward, so long as some independent criteria (economic, educational) are used to determine their backwardness. For a detailed discussion of the Pre-Balaji cases, see “Equality and ‘Protective Discrimination’ in India”, Rutgers Law Review, XVI (1961), 42–74.Google Scholar

²⁸ See “The Problem of Group Membership” in the Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 4 (1962), pp. 331–57.Google Scholar

²⁹ Cf. Spague, Theodore W., “The Rivalry of Intolerances in Race Relations”, Social Forces, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1949), p. 68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ On the religious denomination point, see note 32 below. It has been argued that caste groups may also merit whatever protection is afforded by Art. 29(1) which provides that “Any section of … citizens … having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have a right to conserve the same.” Are castes cultural groups? Apparently to qualify as a cultural group it is not necessary that the group be a minority nor that its distinctiveness be either religious or linguistic. The scope of the guarantee is not yet clear. Apparently the right to “conserve” their culture concerns “the sphere of intellect and culture”. It seems to include the right to transmit this culture; “the right to impart instruction in their own institutions to children of their own community in their own language”, has been referred to as the “greater part of the contents of Art. 29”, State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society, 17 Sup. Ct. J. 678 (1954).

³¹ See e.g., State of Rajasthan v. Pratap Singh A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1208.

³² Articles 26, 30.

³³ Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255; State of Kerela v. Venkiteswara Prabhu A.I.R. 1961 Ker. 55; Commissioner v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, 1954 S.C.R. 1005, 1022. Professor Smith commends the decision in the Devaru case as significant for taking seriously the limits on state sponsored reform imposed by guarantees of religious freedom (p. 243). However, the holding there that denominational temples are included within the “public temples” covered by temple-entry legislation severely circumscribes the rights of denominations.

³⁴ Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 854, held unconstitutional a Bombay Act making excommunication a criminal offense. The case involved a Muslim sect and does not imply a similar protection for caste groups as such; it would presumably protect only those that can qualify as religious denominations. It would probably not protect excommunication that was merely social and was not “to preserve the essentials of religion”.

³⁵ It should be noted that the British policy of non-intervention in caste questions cannot be dated definitively from the abolition of the Calcutta Caste Cutcherry (p. 301). A wide variety of caste questions were cognizable in Bombay until 1827 and in Bengal and Madras until 1860. From these dates down to the present a narrower range of caste issues have elicited judicial determination under such rubrics as defamation, rights in temples, rights to caste property and offices, etc. Caste did appear in the application of Hindu law, but Hindu law was based more on distinctions of varna than of caste; it was never the case that inter-caste marriages were void, but rather inter-varna marriages (cf. pp. 301–2).

³⁶ Professor Smith would protect certain family and intra-caste matters from state interference under the heading of religious freedom (p. 309). And collectively, “[c]aste associations will continue to enjoy full freedom to carry on their activities to advance their respective communities. But as soon as an individual or a caste seeks to impose disabilities on other individuals or castes, or prevent them from exercising their lawful rights, state intervention is justified” (p. 309). But one man's “lawful rights” may be another's disabilities! Do “rights” include a right of religious fellowship? A right to avoid ritual contamination? Do they include the exclusion of lower-caste Hindus from Jain temples? Of other castes from denominational temples? Are such rights subject to redefinition by government from time to time? Cf. his objections to temple-entry laws, p. 137 above.

³⁷ Such a distinction is, of course, more congenial to some religious traditions than others, since it implies a radical dichotomy between profane everyday reality on the one hand and a sacred and autonomous realm of souls on the other. It also seems to imply a sacramental church which acts on the institutions of the profane world, but cannot replace them or alter their ultimate character. Such a view may be profoundly unacceptable to other religious traditions which stress the transformation of worldly institutions in accordance with divine precept. See Hodgson, loc. cit. (note 21) at p. 68.

³⁸ If, on the other hand, the distinction is thought to be arbitrary or conventional, either because religion is a merely conventional designation or because religious aspects may pervade all activity, then such a distinction is itself a matter of choice or policy and the grounds should be stated.

³⁹ Although such a view may be implicit in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnett 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which Professor Smith cites as exemplifying this proposition, it does not represent the prevailing American position. While American courts have shown a recent inclination to accept as “religion” whatever is claimed to be such, this does not imply that whatever is claimed to be within the protected area of religious freedom is protected. See note 43 below.

⁴⁰ Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 7, p. 781,Google Scholar cited at p. 105. But see the author's reaction to the “untenable” distinction between secular and religious used in Madras' control of Hindu endowments (p. 247) quoted above, p. 136.

⁴¹ E.g., “Political power is outside the scope of religion's legitimate aims” (p. 6, italics supplied); “Traditional Hinduism and Islam were far more than ‘religions’ in the usual meaning of the word” (p. 265).

⁴² The relevant constitutional provisions are Arts. 25 and 26. The most comprehensive and useful account of their judicial interpretation is Subramanian, N.A., “Freedom of Religion”, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 3 (1961), pp. 323–50;Google Scholar see also Alexandrowicz, C.H., “The Secular State in India and in the United States”, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 2 (1960), 273–96;Google ScholarGroves, Harry E., “Religious Freedom”, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 4 (1962), pp. 190–203.Google Scholar

⁴³ The American position, roughly, is that religious activities are free to the same extent as identical behavior proceeding from non-religious motives. Religious activities enjoy no special dispensation from general regulation, even where this impinges heavily on certain religious activities. See note 60 below. However, there seems to be a recent shift away from this view t o one which confers what John Roche calls “bonus points” on religiously-motivated behavior. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); In Re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963), vacating 265 Minn. 96.

⁴⁴ Harry E. Groves, loc. cit. (note 42) argues that the provisions of the Indian Constitution allow such wide state regulation of religious practice under the heads of public order, morality, health, etc., that the constitutional position comes to much the same as the American distinction between belief (protected) and practice (subject to regulation).

⁴⁵ From the leading case of Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, loc. cit. (note 33), quoted at p. 107. This case marked the definitive rejection of the narrower “Bombay view” of freedom of religion, derived from the American cases dealing with Mormon polygamy.

⁴⁶ He adduces the example of the caste system which is “an essential part of Hinduism” and implies that since the Supreme Court does not intend to protect caste from all inroads by government, it will not feel more inhibited in intruding on other practices regarded as “religious” by their practitioners. The example of caste is well-taken but not conclusive since among the whole array of socio-religious institutions, certain phases of caste are especially singled out for reform by the Constitution. See “Law and Caste in Modern India” in Asian Survey, Vol. III, No. 11 (11., 1963).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The propensity of the judiciary to credit community estimations of what is religious has vacillated. See Subramaniam, loc. cit., note 42. Cf. J. D. M. Derrett's criticism of the tendency to decide such questions by reference to orthodox and literary sources and without reference to the custom and actual beliefs of the community involved. “The Definition of Religion in Indian Law”, Bombay Law Reporter, LXI, 17 ff., and Postscript at p. 38.Google Scholar The most recent swing of the Supreme Court confirms Professor Smith's prediction. In Durgah Committee v. Hussain Ali, A.I.R. 1961, S.C. 1402, 1415 the Court suggests a distinction between religion itself and practices which “have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs”. In Shri Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1638, 1661 the Court undertakes to disengage the religious from “obviously secular” matters thought to be religious. For an assessment of these decisions, see Rao, B. Parameswara, “Matters of Religion”, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, vol. 5, 509–13 (10–12, 1963).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ A more sanguine view of the freedom of religion in Indian secularism is taken by MrSubramanian, N.A. (“Freedom of Religion”, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 3, 1961, pp. 323–50).Google Scholar He notes that “Among the Fundamental Rights dealt with by the Constitution, those relating to freedom of religion stand in a special category. The importance of Articles 25 and 26 lies not so much in the grant of religious liberty but in its restriction … For the first time in Indian legal history, the regulation of religious freedom is envisaged and sanctioned by the organic law …the sphere of law will inevitably tend to encroach on the hitherto preserves of religion …“ (p. 350).

⁴⁹ Where freedom of conscience is identified as the valued core of religious freedom, state regulation of actions based on conscientious beliefs may not appear as an important diminution of religious freedom. Cf. Derrett, loc. cit. (note 47) at p. 19. But to the extent that religious freedom consists of freedom for conscience rather than deeds, no state could possibly abrogate it (except perhaps by coercing opposing actions) by forbidding any action. For a recent attempt to avoid the implications of equating religious liberty with conscience rather than deeds, see Carillo de Albornoz, A.F., The Basis of Religious Liberty (London, 1963).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Some of the “religious presuppositions” of strict “wall of separation” secularism in the American context have been pointed out by Murray, John Courtney, “Law or Prepossessions” in Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 14 (1949),Google Scholar pp. 28 ff. Cf. Stahler, loc. cit. (note 18). One need not subscribe to the glib assertion that “secularism is a religion” in order to affirm that particular “secular” precepts may be incompatable with particular religious principles.

⁵¹ Presumably a secular position like that proposed in this book might find support from either Christian or humanist convictions depending on whether the kind of religion it entails is preferred because it is more true or merely less mischievous — i.e., whether the underlying aim is to encourage personal devotion or personal secularism.

⁵² The criminal law in India is extraordinarily solicitious of religious sentiments. Sec. 298 of the Indian Penal Code provides up to one year imprisonment for deliberately “wounding the religious feelings of any person” by word, sound or gesture. And sec. 295–A provides up to two years imprisonment for maliciously and deliberately insulting “the religion or religious beliefs” of any class of citizens.

⁵³ Needless to say, such problems are not absent or unrecognized in the United States. A parallel list of conflicts engendered by secular principles could easily be drawn up, involving, e.g., aid to church-related schools, draft-exemptions for conscientious objectors, etc. They reappear, e.g., in the form of what Mr. Justice Brennan recently referred to as “ … an increasingly troublesome First Amendment paradox: that the logical interrelationship between the establishment and free exercise clauses may produce situations where an injunction against an apparent establishment must be withheld in order to avoid infringement of rights of free exercise”, Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 at 247, 296 ff. (1963).

⁵⁴ “It is not the function of the state to promote, regulate, direct or otherwise interfere with religion” (p. 6). It is obvious that such Utopian detachment is possible if at all, only when religions have confined themselves to areas of activity far removed from public life.

⁵⁵ Even now “[w]hile Indian secularism is deficient in several respects when judged by the American standard, in other respects …the Indian practice is a closer approximation to the theory of the secular state” (p. 499).

⁵⁶ It remains to be seen whether any secular state can avoid being flavored by impurities from prevailing religious tradition. In his discussion of the Indian Supreme Court's rather reluctant and tortuous upholding of state laws preventing the slaughter of cows (M. H. Qureshi v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731), he notes that these laws “must be viewed primarily as attempts to impose the taboos of one religion upon all citizens” (p. 439) and notes that the court was forced into a “curious bit of reasoning” in order to reach this result (p. 488). Cf. the reasoning of the U. S. Supreme Court upholding Sunday closing laws in Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).

⁵⁷ See Howe, Mark De Wolfe, “Problems of Religious Liberty” in Friedrich, C.J., ed., Liberty (= Nomos, IV) (1962), 262, 269.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Perhaps war and aggression should be included in this list. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).

⁵⁹ Reynolds v. United States, 89 U.S. 145 (1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 133 (1890); Late Corporation of the Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Cleveland v. U.S., 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948). Among Professor Smith's references to American cases there is only one passing mention of any of the cases suppressing Mormon polygamy; he cites the Reynolds case as “pointedly” enunciating the necessity of the state's power of preserving public order (p. 104).;

⁶⁰ See generally Fellman, David, The Limits of Freedo (New Brunswick, 1959), 24–31;Google Scholar Pfeffer, op. cit. (note 17), 572 ff.; Rubinstein, I.H.Contemporary Religious Juris-prudence (Chicago, 1948).Google Scholar Since these outrageous practices stand in somewhat the same relation to religious freedom as “hard-core pornography” stands to freedom of the press, they may conveniently be labeled “hard-core heresy”. In pointing out these various limitations on the American conception of religious liberty, it is not meant to imply any blanket condemnation of such restrictions. The point is that our easy acceptance of them may make it difficult to appreciate how restricted a sense of religion they imply, thus concealing some of the basic problems for a general formulation of secularism.

⁶¹ See pp. 49&–99, 381, 129n.

⁶² For attempts to demarcate an interpretation of the American provisions more complex than either strict separation or mere impartiality among religions, see Howe, Mark de Wolfe, “The Constitutional Question” in Miller, et al., Religion and the Free Society (Fund for the Republic, 1958), 49–63;Google ScholarKatz, Wilbur G., “The Case for Religious Liberty” in Cogley, J. (ed.), Religion in America (New York, 1958);Google ScholarKauper, Paul, Civil Liberties and the Constitution (Ann Arbor, 1962),Google Scholar chap. 1; Kurland, Philip, Religion and the Law (Chicago, 1962).Google Scholar

⁶³ Professor Smith complains of “the persistent tendency in present-day India to define secularism simply in terms of non-discrimination in the promotion of religion. To most Indians, secular means non-communal or non-sectarian, but it does not mean nonreligious. For most, the basis of the secular state is not a ‘wall of separation’ between state and religion, but rather the ‘no-preference doctrine’ which requires only that no special privileges be granted to any one religion. As defined in this book, the secular state includes the principle that the functions of the state must be non-religious” (p. 381).

⁶⁴ The interpretation of the secular state in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) said to provide “the clearest and simplest answers to the questions which India must deal with” (p. 499).

⁶⁵ E.g., the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, have (and Switzerland contains) established churches. Holland and Belgium provide extensive financial assistance to sectarian institutions. See Pfeffer, op. cit. (note 17), chap. II.

⁶⁶ The very modernization of religion that Professor Smith calls for may be more dangerous to secularism in India than some of the anomalies that he criticizes. With the weakening of communal boundaries, the growth of stronger ecclesiastical organization, increasing use of mass media, greater concern with creed and doctrine rather than locat practice, emphasis on universalistic rather than particularistic appeals, there is the danger that a more widely held, less differentiated and more standardized Hinduism might emerge to menace the secular state. Perhaps it is a race between the modernization of religion on the one hand and the decline of religious zeal on the other.

⁶⁷ I would like to thank Stanley Bernstein, Harold Levy, Yosal Rogat, and Phyllis Rolnick for their valuable comments and suggestions. They are not, of course, responsible for the views stated here.