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FAIR CHANCE AND MODAL CONSEQUENTIALISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2015

H. Orri Stefánsson
H. Orri Stefánsson*
Affiliation:
Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Collge d’études mondiales, 190 avenue de France, 75013 Paris, France. Email: hlynur.orri@gmail.com. URL: www.orristefansson.is.
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Abstract:

This paper develops a Multidimensional Decision Theory and argues that it better captures ordinary intuitions about fair distribution of chances than classical decision theory. The theory is an extension of Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactual prospect and is a form of Modal Consequentialism, according to which the value of actual outcomes often depends on what could have been. Unlike existing versions of modal consequentialism, the multidimensional decision theory allows us to explicitly model the desirabilistic dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes that, I contend, are at the heart of common intuitions about fair distribution of chances.

Keywords

fairnesscounterfactualsdecision theoryconsequentialism

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Type
Articles
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , November 2015 , pp. 371 - 395
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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