Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-79b67bcb76-kmcbj Total loading time: 0.624 Render date: 2021-05-12T22:11:15.043Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": false, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true }

HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 February 2015

Pierre Courtois
Affiliation:
INRA, UMR 1135 LAMETA, 2 place Viala, F-34000 Montpellier, France. Email: courtois@supagro.inra.fr. URL: https://sites.google.com/site/pmccourtois/.
Rabia Nessah
Affiliation:
IESEG, School of Management, UMR 8179 LEM, 3 rue de la Digue, F-59000 Lille, France. Email: r.nessah@ieseg.fr
Tarik Tazdaït
Affiliation:
CNRS, EHESS, Ecole des Ponts ParisTech, UMR 8568 CIRED, 45 bis avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94000 Nogent sur Marne, France. Email: tazdait@centre-cired.fr

Abstract:

Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under which the same individual might play in one fashion versus another.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.

References

Abalo, K. and Kostreva, M.. 2004. Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge Equilibria. Applied Mathematics Letters 17: 569573.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abalo, K. and Kostreva, M.. 2005. Berge Equilibrium: some results from fixed-point theorems. Applied Mathematics and Computation 169: 624638.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aumann, R. 1960. Acceptable points in games of perfect information. Pacific Journal of Mathematics 10: 381417.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berge, C. 1957a. Théorie Générale des Jeux à n-Personnes [General Theory of n-person Games]. Paris: Gauthier Villars.Google Scholar
Berge, C. 1957b. Topological games with perfect information. In Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume III, ed. Dresher, M., Tucker, A. W. and Wolfe, P., 165178. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Berscheid, E. and Walster, E. H.. 1978. Interpersonal Attraction. 2nd edn.Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A.. 2000. Democratic Devices and Desires. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A.. 2008. Revisionist public choice theory. New Political Economy 13: 7788.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brennan, G. and Pettit, P.. 2000. The hidden economy of esteem. Economics and Philosophy 16: 7798.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Colman, A., Körner, T., Musy, O. and Tazdaït, T.. 2011. Mutual support in games: some properties of Berge Equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 55: 166175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eckel, C. and Gintis, H.. 2010. Blaming the messenger: notes on the current state of experimental economics. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 73: 109119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edgeworth, F. Y. 1893 [1997]. Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. London: Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Fischbacher, U., Gachter, S. and Fehr, E.. 2001. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters 71: 397404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gauthier, D. P. 1986. Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. and Gintis, H.. 2004. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small Scale Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kenny, D. A., Mohr, C. D. and Levesque, M. J.. 2001. A social relations variance partitioning of dyadic behavior. Psychological Bulletin 127: 128141.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Larbani, M. and Nessah, R.. 2008. A note on the existence of Berge and Berge-Nash Equilibria. Mathematical Social Sciences 55: 258271.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Luce, R. D. and Raifa, H.. 1957. Games and Decisions. New York, NY: Wiley.Google Scholar
Messick, D. M. and Brewer, M. B.. 1983. Solving social dilemmas: a review. Review of Personality and Social Psychology 4: 1144.Google Scholar
Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y.. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and the invariance in personality structure. Psychological Review 102: 246268.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., and Collins, N. L.. 2006. Optimizing assurance: the risk regulation system in relationships. Psychological Bulletin 132: 641666.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Musy, O., Pottier, A. and Tazdaït, T.. 2012. A new theorem to find Berge Equilibria. International Game Theory Review 14: Art. 1250005.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nessah, R., Larbani, M. and Tazdaït, T.. 2007. A note on Berge Equilibrium. Applied Mathematics Letters 20: 926932.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peck, J. E. L. 1960. Berge Claude: Théorie Générale à n Personnes. Zentralblatt für Mathematik 82: 347348.Google Scholar
Pettit, P. 2005. Construing Sen on commitment. Economics and Philosophy 21: 1532.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pottier, A and Nessah, R.. 2014. Berge-Vaisman and Nash Equilibria: transformation of games. International Game Theory Review forthcoming.Google Scholar
Rasmussen, E. 2007. Games and Information. 4th edn.Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Reis, T. 2008. Reinvigorating the concept of situation in social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review 12: 311329.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Shubik, M. 1961. Review of Claude Berge, The General Theory of n-Person Games. Econometrica 29: 821.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Mechelen, I. and De Raad, B.. 1999. Editorial: Personality and Situations. European Journal of Personality 13: 333336.3.0.CO;2-O>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vanberg, V. 2008. On the economics of moral preferences. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67: 605628.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zan, B and Hildebrandt, C.. 2005. Cooperative and competitive games in constructivist classrooms. The Constructivist 16: 113.Google Scholar
Zhukovskii, V. I. 1985. Some problems of non-antagonistic differential games. In Matematiceskie Metody v Issledovanii Operacij [Mathematical Methods in Operations Research], ed. Kenderov, P., 103195. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.Google Scholar
Zhukovskii, V. I. and Tchikrii, A. A.. 1994. Lineino-Kvadratichnye Differentsial’nye Igry [Linear-Quadratic Differential Games]. Kiev: Naoukova Doumka.Google Scholar

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response


Your details


Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *