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Modeling Rational Players: Part II

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Ken Binmore
Ken Binmore
Affiliation:
London School of Economics
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Extract

This is the second part of a two-part paper. It can be read independently of the first part provided that the reader is prepared to go along with the unorthodox views on game theory which were advanced in Part I and are summarized below. The body of the paper is an attempt to study some of the positive implications of such a viewpoint. This requires an exploration of what is involved in modeling “rational players” as computing machines.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , April 1988 , pp. 9 - 55
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

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