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  • Cited by 4
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Bonanno, Giacomo 2013. A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 78, p. 31.

    Kuechle, Graciela 2009. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE THREE-LEGGED CENTIPEDE GAME?. Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 23, Issue. 3, p. 562.

    de Bruin, Boudewijn 2008. Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games. Synthese, Vol. 163, Issue. 1, p. 79.

    Perea, Andrés 2008. Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction. Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 56, Issue. 1, p. 1.



  • Thorsten Clausing (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 April 2004

A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework.

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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
  • EISSN: 1474-0028
  • URL: /core/journals/economics-and-philosophy
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