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    Martini, Carlo and Pinto, Manuela Fernández 2016. Modeling the social organization of science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science,

    Reiss, Julian 2013. The explanation paradox redux. Journal of Economic Methodology, Vol. 20, Issue. 3, p. 280.



  • Julian Reiss (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 28 November 2012

This paper aims (a) to provide characterizations of realism and instrumentalism that are philosophically interesting and applicable to economics; and (b) to defend instrumentalism against realism as a methodological stance in economics. Starting point is the observation that ‘all models are false’, which, or so I argue, is difficult to square with the realist's aim of truth, even if the latter is understood as ‘partial’ or ‘approximate’. The three cheers in favour of instrumentalism are: (1) Once we have usefulness, truth is redundant. (2) There is something disturbing about causal structure. (3) It's better to do what one can than to chase rainbows.

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