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INCAS AND ALIENS: THE TRUTH IN TELIC EGALITARIANISM

  • Shlomi Segall (a1)
Abstract:

The paper seeks to defend Telic Egalitarianism (TE) by distinguishing two distinct categories into which typical objections to it fall. According to one category of objections (for example, levelling down) TE is groundless. That is, there is simply no good reason to think that inequality as such is bad. The other type of objections to TE focuses on its counterintuitive implications: it is forced to condemn inequalities between ourselves and long-dead Inca peasants, or between us and worse-off aliens from other planets. The paper shows that once we unpack these two types of objections to TE they become much less persuasive.

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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
  • EISSN: 1474-0028
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