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THE PARITY VIEW AND INTUITIONS OF NEUTRALITY

  • MOZAFFAR QIZILBASH (a1)

Abstract

One response to Derek Parfit's ‘mere addition paradox’ invokes the relation of ‘parity’. Since parity is a form of ‘incommensurateness’ in John Broome's terms, three doubts which Broome raises about accounts involving incommensurateness in Weighing Lives pose a challenge for this response. I discuss two of these. They emerge from a discussion of various intuitions about ‘neutrality’. I argue that an account based on parity may be no less consistent with Broome's intuitions than is his own vagueness view.

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Broome, J. 1999. Ethics out of economics. Cambridge
Broome, J. 2001. Greedy neutrality of value. In Value and choice: Volume 2. Some common themes in decision theory and moral philosophy, ed. Rabinowicz:, W.16. Lund
Broome, J. 2004. Weighing lives. Oxford
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Qizilbash, M. forthcoming. The mere addition paradox, incompleteness and vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
  • EISSN: 1474-0028
  • URL: /core/journals/economics-and-philosophy
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