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  • Cited by 2
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Chen, Bo Zhang, Bin and Zhu, Weidong 2011. Combined trust model based on evidence theory in iterated prisoner's dilemma game. International Journal of Systems Science, Vol. 42, Issue. 1, p. 63.

    Rieskamp, Jörg and Todd, Peter M. 2006. The Evolution of Cooperative Strategies for Asymmetric Social Interactions. Theory and Decision, Vol. 60, Issue. 1, p. 69.


Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas

  • Elliott Sober (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 December 2008

When does self-interest counsel cooperation? This question pertains both to the labile behaviors produced by rational deliberation and to the more instinctive and fixed behaviors produced by natural selection. In both cases, a standard starting point for the investigation is the one-shot prisoners' dilemma. In this game, each player has the option of producing one or the other of two behaviors (labeled “cooperate” and “defect”). The pay-offs to the row player are as follows:

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R. Boyd , and J. Lorberbaum , 1987. “No Pure Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game.” Nature 327:5859.

G. Parker , and J. Maynard Smith . 1990. “Optimality Theory in Evolutionary Biology.” Nature 348:2733.

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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
  • EISSN: 1474-0028
  • URL: /core/journals/economics-and-philosophy
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