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Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas

  • Elliott Sober (a1)
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When does self-interest counsel cooperation? This question pertains both to the labile behaviors produced by rational deliberation and to the more instinctive and fixed behaviors produced by natural selection. In both cases, a standard starting point for the investigation is the one-shot prisoners' dilemma. In this game, each player has the option of producing one or the other of two behaviors (labeled “cooperate” and “defect”). The pay-offs to the row player are as follows:

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References
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Axelrod R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic.
Boyd R., and Lorberbaum J., 1987. “No Pure Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game.” Nature 327:5859.
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Maynard Smith J. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parker G., and Smith J. Maynard. 1990. “Optimality Theory in Evolutionary Biology.” Nature 348:2733.
Russell B. 1940. “On the Notion of Cause.” Mysticism and Logic. New York: W. W. Norton.
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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
  • EISSN: 1474-0028
  • URL: /core/journals/economics-and-philosophy
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