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Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas

  • Elliott Sober (a1)
Abstract

When does self-interest counsel cooperation? This question pertains both to the labile behaviors produced by rational deliberation and to the more instinctive and fixed behaviors produced by natural selection. In both cases, a standard starting point for the investigation is the one-shot prisoners' dilemma. In this game, each player has the option of producing one or the other of two behaviors (labeled “cooperate” and “defect”). The pay-offs to the row player are as follows:

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R. Boyd , and J. Lorberbaum , 1987. “No Pure Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game.” Nature 327:5859.

G. Parker , and J. Maynard Smith . 1990. “Optimality Theory in Evolutionary Biology.” Nature 348:2733.

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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
  • EISSN: 1474-0028
  • URL: /core/journals/economics-and-philosophy
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