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  • Cited by 5
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    GREAVES, HILARY 2015. Antiprioritarianism. Utilitas, Vol. 27, Issue. 01, p. 1.


    McCarthy, David 2015. Distributive Equality. Mind, Vol. 124, Issue. 496, p. 1045.


    ORD, TOBY 2015. A New Counterexample to Prioritarianism. Utilitas, Vol. 27, Issue. 03, p. 298.


    McCarthy, David 2013. Risk-Free Approaches to the Priority View. Erkenntnis, Vol. 78, Issue. 2, p. 421.


    PARFIT, DEREK 2012. Another Defence of the Priority View. Utilitas, Vol. 24, Issue. 03, p. 399.


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UTILITARIANISM AND PRIORITARIANISM II

  • David McCarthy (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S026626710800165X
  • Published online: 01 March 2008
Abstract

The priority view has become very popular in moral philosophy, but there is a serious question about how it should be formalized. The most natural formalization leads to ex post prioritarianism, which results from adding expected utility theory to the main ideas of the priority view. But ex post prioritarianism entails a claim which is too implausible for it to be a serious competitor to utilitarianism. In fact, ex post prioritarianism was probably never a genuine alternative to utilitarianism in the first place. By contrast, ex ante prioritarianism is defensible. But its motivation is very different from the usual rationales offered for the priority view. Given the untenability of ex post prioritarianism, it is more natural for most friends of the priority view to revert to utilitarianism.

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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
  • EISSN: 1474-0028
  • URL: /core/journals/economics-and-philosophy
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