John Stuart Mill provides a classic defense of individual and group rights to liberty with respect to purely private or self-regarding matters:

The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself … directly, and in the first instance, … his independence is, of right, absolute.… From this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived. (1859, pp. 224–26)

Economic approaches to both social evaluation and decision-making are typically Paretian or utilitarian in nature and so display commitments to both welfarism and consequentialism. The contrast between the economic approach and any rights-based social philosophy has spawned a large literature that may be divided into two branches. The first is concerned with the compatibility of rights and utilitarianism (or Pare-tianism) seen as independent moral forces (e.g., the debate on the possibility of a Paretian liberal). This branch of the literature may be characterized as an example of the broader debate between the teleological and deontological approaches. The second is concerned with the possibility that substantial rights may be grounded in utilitarianism (or Pare-tianism) with the moral force of rights being derived from more basic commitments to welfarism and consequentialism. This branch of the literature may be characterized as an exploration of the flexibility of the teleological approach, and, in particular, its ability to give rise to views more normally associated with the deontological approach. This essay is concerned with the second branch of the literature.

Should social preferences conform to the principles of rationality we normally expect of individuals? Should they, for instance, conform to the consistency axioms of expected utility theory? This article considers one fragment of this question.

One of the fundamental components of the concept of economic rationality is that preference orderings are “complete,” i.e., that all alternative actions an economic agent can take are comparable (Arrow, 1951; De-breu, 1959). The idea that all actions can be ranked may be called the single utility assumption. The attractiveness of this assumption is considerable. It would be hard to fathom what choice among alternatives means if the available alternatives cannot be ranked by the chooser in some way. In addition, the efficiency criterion makes sense only if one can infer that an individual's choice reflects the best, in expected welfare terms, among all choices that individual could have made (Sen, 1982a). The possibility that a rearrangement of resources could make someone “better off” without making others “worse off” can be understood only if the post-rearrangement world is comparable with the pre-rearrange-ment world.

A recent paper by David Levy (1987) focuses on “utility enhancing consumption constraints.” Levy concludes by noting that his analysis stays within standard utility maximizing theory, in contrast to my analysis of rule-governed behavior (Heiner, 1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c) which allows imperfect decisions that don't always maximize utility. I wish to show how our two theories can be integrated, thereby representing complementary, rather than conflicting, explanations. In the process, I argue that imperfect decisions are an essential factor in the stability of any rule that constrains freedom of choice. I also briefly discuss certain intrinsic problems with achieving “self-stabilizing” rules applied to moral teachings.

In a recent article in this journal, D. Wade Hands (1987) reviewed Charles Taylor's two-volume work, Philosophical Papers (1985). Hands predicts that Taylor's work will have no impact on the philosophy of economics. This may indeed turn out to be the case; but if so, it will only be because the profession is not listening. Of course, it is typical of the profession to be more interested in exporting its product than in learning from other disciplines. This is exemplified in Hands's use of the term “philosophy of economics” – philosophy is the handmaiden of the highly successful enterprise of economics. But this journal is called Economics and Philosophy, which means that a conversation requiring an openness and attentiveness is called for between economics and philosophy.

The social discount rate – the rate at which future benefit flows from government investment are discounted to present value – has been a frequent subject of technical debate among professional economists. From a broader perspective, however, the selection of an appropriate rate enjoins consideration of questions that define the very contours of our public philosophy. It carries implicit assumptions about the nature of citizenship, the relation between public and private spheres, and, most singularly, the status of a political society as it is located in time. A key determinant of intertemporal economic allocation, the social discount rate provides a unique registry of a polity's historical consciousness and perceptions of its intergenerational obligations. Yet the highly technical nature of the debate over the discount rate has proven inhospitable to scholars otherwise inclined to investigate its ethical dimensions. Some, notably A. K. Sen, have begun to address these philosophical issues, though much territory remains to be explored.

Basic liberty, according to Rawls's first principle of justice, is not to be sacrificed for other values such as wealth. And, according to his second principle of justice, the material well-being of the worst-off members of society is not to be sacrificed to benefit better-off members of society. These trade-offs would be unjust, according to Rawls, no matter how small the sacrifice or how large the offsetting benefit. A decision-maker conforming to Rawls's theory, who is unwilling to sacrifice some values in favor of others, has lexical preferences. Lexical preferences, however, are not encountered in studies of consumer demand for market goods. Since goods trade off within the range of choices studied in demand theory, it seems to economists that political values ought to trade off as well.

Parfit's requirements for an ideal Theory X cannot be fully met since the Mere Addition Principle and Non-Antiegalitarianism imply the Repugnant Conclusion: Theory X does not exist. However, since the Repugnant Conclusion is really compelling, the Impersonal Total Principle should be adopted for impartial comparisons concerning future generations. Nevertheless, where our own interests are affected, we may yet choose to be partial, trading off our concern for future (or others') goodness with our self-interests. Theory X' (maximization of number-dampened total utility) meets all Parfit's requirements except the Mere Addition Principle in less compelling cases.

The literature of comparative economics as well as economic history is replete with references to productivity differences as reflecting relative efficiency in production. In socialist economics, for example, the longevity of the relative-productivity/relative-efficiency theme is apparent from Abram Bergson's (1948) early survey where, commenting on a productivity debate that had already been going on for over twenty years, he identified “the only issue outstanding” as the question “which is more efficient, socialism or capitalism?” The issue has continued to be addressed vigorously since then, and it is still outstanding. Again, in European economic history, John Nye (1987) recently pointed out that relative efficiency as reflected in relative productivity has been part and parcel of the postwar debate on French industrialization: the view that less productive and, therefore, “inefficient” family firms led to French “backwardness” in production.