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Efficient emission reduction through joint implementation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 July 2008

P. G. Babu  and
Bibhas Saha
P. G. Babu
Affiliation:
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Gen. A. K. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (East), Mumbai 400 065, India
Bibhas Saha
Affiliation:
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Gen. A. K. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (East), Mumbai 400 065, India
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Abstract

This paper models joint implementation (JI) for emission reduction between a developed and a developing country. When the per unit price of JI abatement is negotiated, the relative pay-offs deviate from the ratio of bargaining powers. When firms bargain, country-wise gains can increase with a greater abatement target. But if the governments bargain, the developing country's gains increase at the expense of the developed country as the target increases. However, the Pareto optimal JI can be achieved only when the governments negotiate over both abatement and transfer.

Information

Type
Theory and Applications
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 1 , Issue 4 , October 1996 , pp. 445 - 464
Copyright
Copyright © 1996, Cambridge University Press

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